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Michel Foucault “Security, Territory, Population”

Foucault, Michel 2009. Security, Territory, Population: lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1978. New York: Picador

11 January 1978

[…] bio-power. By this I mean a number of phenomena that seem to me to be quite significant, namely, the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power, or, in other words, how, starting from the eighteenth century, modern western societies took on board the fundamental biological fact that human beings are a species. (1)

Power is not founded on itself or generated by itself. […] Mechanisms of power are an intrinsic part of all these relations and, in a circular way, are both their effect and cause. (2)

1)       […] laying down a law and fixing a punishment for the person who breaks it, which is the system of the legal code with a binary division between the permitted and the prohibited, and a coupling, comprising the code, between a type of prohibited action and a type of punishment. This, then, is the legal or juridical mechanism. (5)

2)       The disciplinary mechanism is characterized by the fact that a third personage, the culprit, appears within the binary system of the code, and at the same time, outside the code, and outside the legislative act that establishes the law and the judicial act that punishes the culprit, a series of adjacent, detective, medical, and psychological techniques appear which fall within the domain of surveillance, diagnosis, and the possible transformation of individuals. (5)

3)       The third form is not typical of the legal code or the disciplinary mechanism, but of the apparatus (dispositif) of security […] the apparatus of security inserts the phenomenon in question, namely theft, within a series of probable events. Second, the reactions of power to this phenomenon are inserted in a calculation of cost. Finally, third, instead of a binary division between the permitted and the prohibited, one establishes an average considered as optimal on the one hand, and, on the other, a bandwidth of the acceptable that must not be exceeded. (6)

[…] security is a way of making the old armatures of law and discipline function in addition to the specific mechanisms of security. (10)

[…] the individual is not the primary datum on which discipline is exercised. Discipline only exists insofar as there is a multiplicity and an end, or an objective or result to be obtained on the basis of this multiplicity. […] The individual is much more a particular way of dividing up the multiplicity for a discipline than the raw material from which it is constructed. Discipline is a mode of individualization of multiplicities rather than something that constructs an edifice of multiple elements on the basis of individuals who are worked on as, first of all, individuals. So sovereignty and discipline, as well as security, can only be concerned with multiplicities. (12)

1)      Discipline works in an empty, artificial space that is to be completely constructed. Security will rely on a number of material givens. (19)

2)      [Second], this given will not be reconstructed to arrive at a point of perfection, as in a disciplinary town. It is simply a matter of maximizing the positive elements […] One will therefore work not only on natural givens, but also on quantities that can be relatively, but never wholly reduced, and, since they can never be nullified, one works on probabilities. (19)

3)      Third, these town developments try to organize elements that are justified by their polyfunctionality. (19)

4)      Finally, the fourth important point, is that one works on the future, that is to say, the town will not be conceived or planned according to a static perception that would ensure the perfection of the function there and then, but will open onto a future that is not exactly controllable, not precisely measured or measurable, and a good town plan takes into account precisely what might happen. (20)

To summarize all this, let’s say then that sovereignty capitalizes a territory, raising the major problem of the seat of government, whereas discipline structures a space and addresses the essential problem of a hierarchical and functional distribution of elements, and security will try to plan a milieu in terms of events or series of events or possible elements, of series that will have to be regulated within a multivalent and transformable framework. The specific space of security refers then to a series of possible events; it refers to the temporal and the uncertain, which have to be inserted within a given space. The space in which a series of uncertain elements unfold is, I think, roughly what one can call the milieu. (20)

The milieu is a set of natural givens – rivers, marshes, hills – and a set of artificial givens – an agglomeration of individuals, of houses, etcetera. The milieu is a certain number of combined, overall effects bearing on all who live in it. It is an element in which a circular link is produced between effects and causes, since an effect from one point of view will be a cause from another. (21)

Finally, the milieu appears as a field of intervention in which, instead of affecting individuals as a set of legal subjects capable of voluntary actions – which would be the case of sovereignty – and instead of affecting them as a multiplicity of organisms, of bodies capable of performances, and of required performances – as in discipline – one tries to affect, precisely, a population. I mean a multiplicity of individuals who are and fundamentally and essentially only exist biologically bound to the materiality within which they live. What one tries to reach through this milieu, is precisely the conjunction of a series of events produced by these individuals, populations, and groups, and quasi natural events which occur around them. (21)

[…] we see the sudden emergence of the problem of the “naturalness”* of the human species within an artificial milieu. (21-22)

18 january 1978

All  of  this,  that  is  to  say  that  completely  concrete element  of  the  behavior  of  homo  œconomicus,  must  also  be  taken  into account.    In  other  words,  it  is  an  economics,  or  a  political-economic analysis that integrates the  moment of production, the world market, and, finally,  the  economic  behavior  of  the  population,  of  producers  and consumers. (41)

The  people comprises  those  who  conduct  themselves in  relation  to the  management of the population, at the level of the population, as if they were not part of the  population  as  a  collective  subject-object,  as  if  they  put  themselves outside of it, and consequently the people is those who, refusing to be the population, disrupt the system. (43-44)

In any case, and to end  with this, I would like to  show you that, if we  want  a  better  grasp  of  the  characteristics  of  the  kind  of  apparatus (dispositif)  that  the  physiocrats  and  eighteenth  century  economists conceived with regard to scarcity, then I think we should compare it to the disciplinary mechanisms found not only in earlier periods, but in the same period  that  apparatuses  of  security  were  being  deployed:

1) Discipline  is essentially centripetal.    I mean that discipline functions to the extent that it isolates a space, that it determines a  segment.    Discipline  concentrates,  focuses,  and  encloses.    The  first action  of discipline  is in fact to  circumscribe a space  in which its power and  the  mechanisms  of  its  power  will  function  fully  and  without  limit. […]In contrast, you can see that the apparatuses of security, as I have tried to reconstruct  them,  have  the  constant  tendency  to  expand;  they  are centrifugal.    New elements are  constantly  being integrated:    production, psychology,  behavior,  the  ways  of  doing  things  of  producers,  buyers, consumers,  importers,  and  exporters,  and  the  world  market.    Security therefore  involves  organizing,  or  anyway  allowing  the  development  of ever-wider circuits. (44-45)

2) By  definition,  discipline regulates everything.  Discipline allows nothing to escape.  Not only does it  not  allow  things  to  run  their  course,  its  principle  is  that  things,  the smallest  things,  must  not  be  abandoned  to  themselves. […]The  apparatus  of  security,  by  contrast, as you  have  seen, “lets things happen.” […]The  basic  function  of  discipline  is  to  prevent everything, even  and  above  all  the detail.   The  function  of security is to rely on  details that are  not valued  as good or evil  in themselves, that are taken  to  be  necessary,  inevitable  processes,  as  natural  processes  in  the broad  sense,  and  it  relies  on  these  details, which  are  what  they  are, but which are not considered to be pertinent in themselves, in order to obtain something   that is considered  to be  pertinent in  itself because  situated at the level of the population. (45)

3) A good discipline  tells you what you must do at every moment. […]In  the  system  of  the  law,  what  is  undetermined  is what  is  permitted;  in  the  system  of  disciplinary regulation,  what  is determined is what one must do, and consequently everything else, being undetermined, is prohibited. […]The mechanism of security works on the basis of this reality, by trying to use it  as  a  support  and  make  it  function,  make  its  components  function  in relation  to  each  other.    In  other words, the  law prohibits and  discipline prescribes, and  the  essential  function  of  security,  without  prohibiting  or prescribing, but possibly making use of some  instruments of prescription and prohibition, is to respond to a reality in such a way that this response cancels out the reality to which it responds – nullifies it, or limits, checks, or  regulates  it.    I  think  this  regulation  within  the  element  of  reality  is fundamental in apparatuses of security. (46-47)

We  could  even say  that  the  law works in  the  imaginary,  since  the law imagines  and  can only formulate  all  the  things that could  and  must not  be  done  by  imagining  them.    It  imagines  the  negative.    Discipline works in  a  sphere  that  is,  as it were, complementary  to  reality.    Man  is wicked, bad, and has evil  thoughts and  inclinations, etcetera.   So, within the  disciplinary  space  a  complementary  sphere  of  prescriptions  and obligations is constituted that is all  the more artificial  and constraining as the  nature  of  reality  is  tenacious  and  difficult  to  overcome.    Finally security,  unlike  the  law  that  works  in  the  imaginary  and  discipline  that works in  a  sphere  complementary  to  reality, tries to  work  within  reality, by  getting  the  components  of  reality  to  work  in  relation  to  each  other, thanks to and through a series of analyses and specific arrangements. (47)

The  game  of  liberalism  –  not interfering,  allowing  free  movement,  letting  things  follow  their  course; laisser  faire, passer  et aller  – basically  and  fundamentally means acting so  that  reality  develops,  goes  its  way,  and  follows  its  own  course according  to  the  laws,  principles,  and  mechanisms  of  reality  itself. (48)

25 january 1978

1) Discipline,  of  course,  analyzes  and  breaks  down;  it breaks  down  individuals,  places,  time,  movements,  actions,  and operations.   It breaks them down  into components such  that they  can  be seen,  on  the  one  hand,  and  modified  on  the  other.    It  is  this  famous

disciplinary,  analytical-practical  grid  that  tries  to  establish  the  minimal elements  of  perception  and  the  elements  sufficient  for  modification. (56-57)

2) Second, discipline classifies the  components thus identified according to definite objectives.    What  are  the  best actions for achieving a particular result:   What is the best movement for loading one’s rifle, what is the best position  to  take?    What  workers  are  best  suited  for  a  particular  task?  What  children  are  capable  of  obtaining  a  particular  result? (57)

3) Third, discipline  establishes  optimal  sequences  or  co-ordinations:    How  can actions  be  linked  together?    How  can  soldiers  be  deployed  for  a maneuver?    How can  schoolchildren be  distributed  hierarchically within classifications? (57)

4) Fourth,  discipline  fixes  the  processes  of  progressive training  (dressage)  and  permanent  control,  and  finally,  on  the  basis  of this,  it  establishes  the  division  between  those  considered  unsuitable  or incapable and the others.  That is to say, on this basis it divides the normal from  the  abnormal. (57)

Disciplinary  normalization  consists  first  of  all  in positing  a  model,  an  optimal  model  that  is  constructed  in  terms  of  a certain  result, and  the operation  of disciplinary  normalization consists in trying  to  get  people,  movements, and  actions to  conform  to  this  model, the normal  being precisely that which can conform to this norm, and the abnormal  that  which  is  incapable  of  conforming  to  the  norm.    In  other words,  it  is  not  the  normal  and  the  abnormal  that  is  fundamental  and primary in disciplinary normalization, it is the  norm. (57)

We have then a system that is, I believe, exactly the opposite of the one we have seen with the disciplines.  In the disciplines one started from a norm, and it was in relation to the training carried out with reference to the  norm  that  the  normal  could  be  distinguished  from  the  abnormal.  Here,  instead,  we  have  a  plotting  of  the  normal  and  the  abnormal,  of different curves of normality, and the  operation of normalization consists in  establishing  an  interplay  between  these  different  distributions  of normality  and  [in]  acting  to  bring  the  most  unfavorable  in  line  with  the more favorable.    So we  have  here  something that starts from the normal and makes use of certain distributions considered to be, if you like, more normal  than  the  others,  or  at  any  rate  more  favorable  than  the  others.  These  distributions will  serve  as the  norm.    The norm  is an  interplay of differential normalities.*  The normal comes first and the norm is deduced from it, or the  norm is fixed and plays its operational  role on the basis of this study of normalities.  So, I would say that what is involved here is no longer normation, but rather normalization in the strict sense. (63)

No  longer  the  safety  (sûreté)  of  the  prince  and  his territory, but  the  security  (sécurité) of  the  population  and,  consequently, of those who govern it.  I think this is another very important change. (65)

They do  not attempt, at least not primarily or in a fundamental  way, to make use of a relationship of obedience between a higher will, of the sovereign, and the wills of those subjected to his will.  In other  words, the  mechanism of security  does not  function on  the  axis of  the  sovereign-subjects relationship,  ensuring  the  total  and  as  it  were passive  obedience  of individuals to their sovereign. (65)

So mechanisms of security are not put  to work on the sovereign-subjects axis or in the form of the prohibition. (66)

It  is  a  matter  rather  of revealing  a  level  of  the  necessary  and  sufficient  action  of  those  who govern.    This  pertinent  level  of  government  action  is  not  the  actual totality of the  subjects in  every  single  detail,  but the  population  with  its specific  phenomena  and  processes. (66)

Through these examples  we  can  see  that  what  is  involved  is,  on  the  one  hand,  a completely  different  economy  of power  and,  on  the  other  hand  –  and  I would  now  like  to  say  a  few  words  about  this  –  an  absolutely  new political  personage  that  I  do  not  think  existed  previously,  that  had  not been  perceived  or  recognized,  as  it  were,  or  singled  out,  and  this  new personage  that  makes  a  remarkable  entrance  and,  what’s  more,  is  very quickly noted in the eighteenth century, is the population. (67)

The population as the source  of  wealth, as a  productive  force, and  disciplinary  supervision  are all  of  a  piece  within  the  thought,  project,  and  political  practice  of  the mercantilists. (69)

But what does this “naturalness”† of the population signify?   What is it that means that the  population will  henceforth be seen, not from the standpoint  of  the  juridical-political  notion  of  subject,  but  as  a  sort  of technical-political  object  of management and government?

1)      First, as  problematised  in  thought,  but  [also]  in  eighteenth  century governmental  practice,  the  population  is  not  the  simple  sum  of individuals inhabiting a territory. […]So you can see that a completely different technique is emerging that is not getting subjects to obey the sovereign’s will, but having a hold on things that seem far removed from the population, but which, through calculation, analysis, and reflection, one knows can really have  an  effect on  it. (70/72)

2)      We could also say that the naturalness of the  population appears in a  second  way  in  the  fact  that  this  population  is  of  course  made  up  of individuals who are  quite  different from each  other and  whose behavior, within  a  certain  limit  at  least,  cannot  be  accurately  predicted. […]The  production of the collective interest through  the play of desire  is  what  distinguishes  both  the  naturalness  of  population  and  the possible artificiality of the means one adopts to manage it. (73)

3)      Finally,  the  naturalness  of  the  population,  which  appears  in  this universal  benefit  of  desire,  and  also  in  the  fact  that  the  population  is always dependent upon complex and modifiable variables, appears again in a third way.  It appears in the  constancy of phenomena  that one might expect to  be  variable  since  they  depend on  accidents, chance, individual conduct,  and  conjunctural  causes. […]With the emergence of mankind as a species, within a field of the definition of all  living species, we  can say that man appears in the first  form  of  his  integration  within  biology.    From  one  direction,  then, population  is  the  human  species,  and  from  another  it  is  what  will  be called the public.  Here again, the word is not new, but its usage is.†   The public,  which  is  a  crucial  notion  in  the  eighteenth  century,  is  the population  seen  under  the  aspect  of  its  opinions,  ways  of  doing  things, forms of behavior, customs, fears, prejudices, and requirements; it is what one  gets a  hold on through education, campaigns, and  convictions.   The population is therefore everything that extends from biological rootedness through the species up to the surface that gives one a hold provided by the public.  From the species to the public; we have here a whole field of new realities in the sense that they are the  pertinent elements for mechanisms of power, the pertinent space within which and regarding which one must act. (74-75)

Hence the theme of man, and  the  “human  sciences”*   that analyze him  as a  living  being, working  individual, and  speaking  subject,  should be understood on the basis of the emergence of population as the correlate of power and the  object of knowledge.   After  all, man,  as he  is thought and  defined  by  the  so-called  human  sciences  of  the  nineteenth  century, and  as he  is reflected  in  nineteenth  century  humanism,  is nothing  other than a figure of population. (79)

1 february 1978

The  word  “economy” designated  a  form  of  government in  the sixteenth  century;  in  the  eighteenth  century, through a series of complex  processes that are absolutely  crucial for our history, it will designate  a  level  of reality and  a  field of intervention  for government.   So, there  you have what is governing and being governed. (95)

The essential, the main element, then, is this complex of men and things, the territory and property being only variables. (97)

This  word “disposer”  is  important  because,  what  enabled  sovereignty   to  achieve  its  aim  of obedience to the laws, was the law itself; law and sovereignty  were absolutely  united. Here,  on  the  contrary,  it  is  not   a  matter  of  imposing  a  law  on  men,  but  of  the disposition of things, that is to say, of employing tactics rather than laws, or, of as far as possible  employing  laws as tactics; arranging things so that this or that  end may  be achieved through a certain number of means. (99)

1) The  perspective  of  population,  the  reality  of phenomena  specific to population, makes it possible  to eliminate the  model of the  family  and to re-focus the notion  of  economy   on  something  else. […]It is therefore no longer a model; it is a segment whose  privilege  is  simply  that  when  one  wants  to  obtain  something  from  the population  concerning  sexual  behavior,  demography,  the  birth  rate,  or  consumption, then  one  has  to  utilize  the  family.    The  family will  change  from  being  a  model  to being  an instrument; it will become a privileged instrument for the government  of the population  rather  than  a  chimerical  model  for  good  government. […] What enables population to unblock the art of government is that it eliminates the model of the family. (104-105)

2) Second,  population  will  appear  above  all  as  the  final  end  of  government.  What  can the end of government be?  Certainly  not just to govern, but to improve the condition  of  the population,  to  increase  its wealth, its  longevity, and its health.   And the instruments that government  will  use to obtain these ends are, in a way, immanent to the field of population; it will be by acting  directly on the population itself through campaigns,  or,  indirectly,  by,  for  example,  techniques  that,  without  people  being aware  of  it,  stimulate  the  birth rate,  or  direct  the  flows  of  population  to  this or  that region or activity.  Population, then, appears as the end and instrument of government rather than  as the  sovereign’s strength:   it is the  subject of  needs and  aspirations, but also  the  object  of  government  manipulation;  vis-à-vis  government,  [population]  is both  aware  of  what it wants and unaware of what is being  done  to  it. (105

3) Finally,  population  will be the  point around  which what the  sixteenth  century texts called the  “sovereign’s  patience”  is  organized    This means that the  population will  be  the  object that government will have  to  take  into  account in  its observations and  knowledge,  in order  to  govern effectively in  a  rationally reflected  manner.   The constitution of a knowledge (savoir) of government is absolutely inseparable from the constitution  of  a  knowledge  of  all  the  processes revolving  around  population  in  the wider  sense  of  what  we  now  call  “the  economy.” (106)

the  idea  of  a  government  as government  of  population  makes the  problem  of  the  foundation  of  sovereignty   even  more  acute  (and  we  have Rousseau) and it makes the need to develop the  disciplines even more  acute  (and we have  the  history  of  the  disciplines  that  I  have  tried  to  analyze  elsewhere). So  we should  not see  things as  the  replacement of  a  society  of  sovereignty by a  society of discipline, and then of a  society of discipline by a society, say, of government.  In fact we  have  a  triangle:    sovereignty,  discipline,  and  governmental  management,  which has  population  as  its  main  target   and  apparatuses  of  security   as  its  essential mechanism. (107-108)

This state of government, which  essentially   bears  on  the  population  and  calls  upon  and  employs  economic knowledge  as an instrument, would correspond to a  society controlled by  apparatuses of security. (110)

8 february 1978

But, generally  speaking, I think we can say  that the origin  of  the  idea  of  a  government  of  men  should  be  sought  in  the  East,  in  a  pre-Christian East first of all, and then in the Christian East, and in two forms:  first, in the idea  and  organization  of  a  pastoral  type  of  power,  and  second,  in  the  practice  of spiritual direction, the direction of souls. (123)

The shepherd’s power is not exercised over a territory  but, by definition, over a flock, and more exactly, over the flock in its movement from one place to another.  The shepherd’s power is essentially exercised over a multiplicity in movement. (125)

The  shepherd’s (pasteur) power manifests itself, therefore, in a duty, a  task to be undertaken, so that – and I think this is also an important  characteristic of pastoral power  –  the  form  it   takes  is  not  first  of  all  the  striking  display   of  strength  and superiority.   Pastoral  power  initially manifests itself in its zeal, devotion, and endless application. (127)

The  shepherd  (pasteur)  serves  the  flock  and  must  be  an  intermediary between the flock and pasture, food, and salvation, which implies that pastoral  power is  always  a  good  in  itself. (128)

Finally, the  last feature, which confirms some of things I have  been saying, is the  idea that pastoral  power is an individualizing  power.  That is to say, it  is true  that the  shepherd directs the  whole flock, but  he  can only really direct it insofar as not  a single  sheep escapes  him. (128)

To sum up, we  can say that the  idea of a pastoral  power is the idea of a power exercised on a multiplicity rather than on a territory.  It is a power that guides towards an end and functions as an intermediary towards this end.  It is therefore a power with a  purpose  for  those  on  whom  it  is  exercised,  and  not  a  purpose  for  some  kind  of superior  unit like  the  city,  territory,  state,  or  sovereign [  … † ].   Finally, it is a  power directed at all  and  each  in their paradoxical  equivalence,  and not at  the  higher unity formed  by the  whole. (129)

22 february 1978

It is an art of “governing  men,”* and I think this is where we should look  for  the  origin, the  point of  formation, of crystallization, the  embryonic  point of the  governmentality  whose  entry into  politics,  at  the  end  of the  sixteenth  and  in  the seventeenth and  eighteenth  centuries,  marks the  threshold  of  the  modern  state.   The modern state is born, I think, when governmentality  became a calculated and reflected practice.  The Christian pastorate seems to me  to be the background of this process, it being  understood  that,  on  the  one  hand,  there  was  a  huge  gap between  the  Hebraic theme of the shepherd and the Christian pastorate  and, on the  other, that  there  will  of course  be  a  no  less  important  and  wide  gap  between  the  government  or  pastoral direction of individuals and communities, and the development of arts of government, the specification of a field of political intervention, from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. (165)

Now  I  think  Christianity  added  four  more  absolutely  specific  and unprecedented  principles to  that of  the  full  and  paradoxical  distributive  character  of pastoral power.

1) First there is the principle of what I will call analytical responsibility.  […]So  it  is  not  just  a  responsibility   defined  by   a  numerical  and individual  distribution,  but also  a  responsibility  defined  by  a  qualitative  and  factual distribution.    The  pastor  will  be  questioned  and  examined,  and,  Saint  Benedict says, he  will  have  to  account  for  everything  that   every  single  sheep  has  done. (169-170)

2) The  second principle, which is also  completely specific  to  Christianity, I will call  the  principle  of exhaustive  and  instantaneous transfer. […]The  pastor  will  also  have  to  consider an  evil  that happens to a sheep, or which occurs through or because of a sheep, as an evil that  is happening  to him or that he has done himself.  He must  take delight in the good of the sheep with a particular and personal  joy, and grieve  or repent  for the evil  due to his sheep. (170)

3) The  third  principle  is  that   of  sacrificial  reversal,  which  is  once  again completely specific to the Christian pastorate. […]the pastor must be prepared to die a biological death if  his sheep are  at  risk,  he  must defend  them  against their temporal  enemies,  but he must also be  prepared to die  in the  spiritual  sense,  that is to  say the pastor  must risk his  soul  for  the  souls of others. (170-171)

4) The fourth principle, the fourth mechanism that we find in the definition of the Christian pastor is what  could be called, again in a completely schematic and arbitrary way,  the  principle  of  alternate  correspondence. […]just as  on  one  side  the  pastor’s merit and salvation are  due  to the weaknesses of his sheep, so  too the pastor’s faults and  weaknesses  contribute  to  the  edification  of  his  sheep   and  are  part  of  the movement, the process of guiding them towards salvation. (171-172)

Complete subordination:

1) First,  it  is  a  relationship  of submission,  but not submission  to  a  law  or  a  principle  of  order,  and  not  even  to  a reasonable  injunction,  or  to  some  reasoned  principles  or  conclusions. […]Christian  obedience  is  not  obedience  to  a  law,  a principle, or any  rational  element whatsoever,  but subordination to someone  because he is someone. […]Christian obedience, the sheep’s obedience to his pastor, is therefore a complete obedience  of  [one]  individual  to  another  individual.    What’s  more,  the  person  who obeys, the person who is subject to the order, is called the subditus, literally, he who is dedicated, given  to  someone else,  and  who is entirely  at their disposition  and subject to their will.  It is a relationship of complete servitude. (175/177)

2) Second, it is a relationship that is not finalized, in the sense that when a Greek entrusted himself to a  doctor or  a  philosopher, it was in order to arrive  at a  particular result. […]Now in Christian obedience, there is no end, for what does Christian obedience  lead to?    It leads quite  simply to  obedience.   One  obeys in order to be obedient, in order to arrive at  a state§  of obedience. […]Greek apatheia guarantees mastery  of oneself.  In  a  way, it is the  other side  of  self-mastery. (177-178) That is to say, in pastoral power […] we have a mode of individualization that not only does not take place by way of affirmation of the self, but one that entails destruction of the self. (180)

3) Finally, third, there is the problem of truth, […]First, there is the fact that  this teaching must be a direction of daily  conduct.  It is not just a matter of teaching  what one must know and what one  must do.   It is not just a  matter of teaching  by general  principles, but rather by  a  daily  modulation, and this  teaching  must   also  pass  through  an  observation,  a  supervision,  a  direction exercised  at  every moment and with the  least discontinuity possible  over the sheep’s whole,  total  conduct. (180-181) The  second  aspect,  which  is  also  very  important,  is  spiritual  direction (direction de  conscience).‡   That is to say, the  pastor must not simply  teach the truth.  He must direct the conscience. (180)

1 march 1978

The  Western  and  Eastern  Christian  pastorate  developed  against everything  that,  retrospectively,  might be  called  disorder.    So  we  can  say  that  there was an immediate and founding correlation between conduct and counter-conduct. (196)

Could  we  not  try   to  find  a  word  to  designate  what  I  have  called resistance, refusal, or revolt?   How can we designate the type of revolts, or rather the sort of specific  web of resistance  to  forms of  power  that do not exercise  sovereignty and  do  not  exploit,  but   “conduct”†? (200)

1) First asceticism. You will say that it is a bit paradoxical to present asceticism as  counter-conduct  when  we  are  accustomed  to  linking  asceticism  with  the  very essence  of Christianity, contrasting  it with ancient religions by  making  it a religion of ascesis. […]What  was there, in fact, in asceticism that was incompatible  with obedience, or what was there  in  obedience that was essentially  anti-ascetic?   In the  first place, I think  that  ascesis  is  an  exercise  of  self  on  self;  it  is  a  sort  of  close  combat  of  the individual  with himself in which the authority, presence, and gaze of someone else is, if not impossible, at least  unnecessary.  Second, asceticism is a progression according to a scale of increasing  difficulty.  It is, in the strict sense of the term, an exercise,‡  an exercise  going  from  the  easier  to  the  more  difficult,  and  from  the  more  difficult to what is  even  more  difficult. (204-205) Insofar  as  the  pastorate  characterizes  its  structures  of  power,  Christianity   is fundamentally  anti-ascetic,  and  asceticism  is  rather  a  sort  of  tactical  element,  an element   of  reversal  by   which  certain  themes  of  Christian  theology   or  religious experience  are  utilized  against  these  structures  of  power.    Asceticism  is  a  sort  of exasperated and reversed obedience  that has become egoistic self-mastery.   Let’s say that in asceticism there is a specific excess that denies access to an external power. (207-8)

2) The  second  element  is communities.    There  is  in  fact another,  to  a  certain extent opposite  way of refusing  submission to pastoral  power, which is the formation of  communities.    Asceticism  has  an  individualizing  tendency.    The  community  is something  completely  different. (208) Somewhat  as  asceticism  had  this  aspect of  almost ironic  exaggeration  in relation to the  pure  and  simple  rule  of  obedience,  we  could  say  that  in  some  of  these communities there  was a  counter-society  aspect, a  carnival aspect, overturning  social relations and hierarchy. (211-212)

3) The  third element, a  third form of counter-conduct is mysticism,*  that is to say,  the  privileged status of  an experience  that by definition  escapes pastoral power.  (212)

4) [The fourth element], my penultimate point – and here I can go very quickly – is the problem of Scripture.   That is to  say,  it is not that the  privileges of Scripture did  not  exist  in  the  system  of  pastoral  power,  but  it is  quite  clear  that  it  was  as if Scripture  was  relegated  to  the  background  of  the  essential  presence,  teaching, intervention, and speech of the pastor himself.   In the  movements of counter-conduct that  develop  throughout  the  Middle  Ages,  it  is  precisely  the  return  to  the  texts,  to Scripture, that is used against and to short-circuit , as it were, the pastorate. (213)

5) Finally,  [the  fifth  element],  and  I  will  stop  here,  is  eschatological  beliefs.  After all, the  other way of disqualifying  the pastor’s role is to claim that  the times are fulfilled or in the  process of being  fulfilled, and that God will return or is returning to gather  his flock. (214)

Rather,  the  point of  view  of  power  is a way  of  identifying  intelligible  relations  between  elements  that are  external  to  each other. (215)

8 march 1978

With  principia  naturae  and  ratio  status,  principles  of nature and raison d’État, nature and state, the  two great references of the knowledge  (savoirs)  and  techniques  given  to  modern  Western  man  are finally constituted, or finally separated. (238)

15 march 1978

Well, “reason” is a  word used in two senses:   Reason is the entire essence  of a thing, which  constitutes the  union,  the combination of all  its  parts;  it is the  necessary bond between the different  elements that constitute a  thing.‡   That is reason.  But “reason” is also employed in another sense.  Subjectively, reason is a  certain power of the soul that  enables  it  to  know  the  truth  of  things,  that  is  to  say,  precisely  that  bond,  that integrity  of the different parts that constitutes a thing.  Reason is therefore a means of knowledge,  but  it  is  also  something  that  allows  the  will  to  adjust  itself  to  what  it knows, that  is to say  to adjust itself to the  very  essence of things. (256)

The  art of  government and raison d’État no longer pose a problem of origin:  we are always already in a world of government, raison d’État, and the state. (259)

There  was no state or kingdom destined  to indefinite repetition in time.  Instead, we now find ourselves in a  perspective  in which historical time is indefinite, in  a  perspective  of  indefinite  governmentality with  no foreseeable  term  or  final  aim.  We are in open historicity due to the indefinite character of the political art. (260)

At  the  start  of  the  seventeenth  century  I  think  we  see  the  appearance  of  a completely different description of the knowledge required by  someone who governs. […]That is  to say,  the  sovereign’s necessary knowledge  (savoir)  will  be  a  knowledge  (connaissance)  of  things  rather  than knowledge  of the law, and this knowledge of the  things that comprise the very reality of  the  state  is  precisely  what  at the  time  was  called  “statistics.” (274)

And with regard to truth, when theorists of raison d’État lay stress on the  public and the  need for a public opinion,  the  analysis is conducted, as it were, in purely passive terms.    It  is  a  question  of  giving  individuals  a  certain  representation,  an  idea,  of imposing  something  on  them,  and  not  in  the  least  of  actively  making  use  of  their attitudes, opinions,  and ways of doing  things.    In  other  words,  I think  raison  d’État really did define  an art of government in which there was an implicit reference to the population,  but  precisely  population  had  not  yet  entered  into  the  reflexive  prism. From the beginning  of the seventeenth to the middle of the eighteenth century  there is a  series  of  transformations  thanks  to  which  and  through  which  this  notion  of population,  which  will  be  a  kind  of  central  element  in  all  political  life,  political reflection,  and  political  science  from  the  eighteenth  century,  is  elaborated.    It  is elaborated through an apparatus (appareil) that was installed in order to make raison d’État  function.    This  apparatus  is  police.    It  is  the  intervention  of  this  field  of practices called police  that brings to light this new subject  in this, if you like, general absolutist theory of raison d’État. (278)

22 march 1978

The plurality  of states is not a transitional phase imposed on men for a  time  and as a punishment.   In  fact,  the  plurality of  states is the  very necessity of a history that is now completely open and not temporally oriented towards a final unity.  The  theory   of  raison  d’État  I  talked  about   last  week  entails  an  open  time  and  a multiple spatiality. (290)

To use somewhat anachronistic words for this reality,  a  state can  only assert itself in a space of political and economic competition, which is what gives meaning to the problem of the state’s expansion as the principle, the main theme of raison d’État. (292)

At  any  rate,  in  passing  from  the  rivalry  of princes  to  competition  between  states,  to  thinking  of  confrontation  in  terms  of competition  between  states,  it  is  clear  that  we  expose  and  lay  bare  an  absolutely essential  and  fundamental  notion  that  previously   did  not  appear  and  was  not formulated in any of  the  theoretical  texts of raison  d’État  I  have been  talking  about, and  this  notion  is,  of  course,  that  of  force.    No  longer  territorial  expansion, but the development   of  the  state’s  forces;  no  longer  the  extension  of  possessions  or matrimonial  alliances, [but]  increase  of  the  state’s  forces; no longer the  combination of legacies through  dynastic alliances, but the  composition of  state forces in political and provisional alliances:  all this will be the raw material, the object, and, at  the same time,  the  principle of intelligibility of political reason. […]We  enter  a  politics  whose  principal  object  will  be  the  employment   and calculation of forces.  Politics, political science, encounters the problem of dynamics. (295)

The  third  instrument  of  this  military-diplomatic  system  for  maintaining European balance – the first was a new form, a new conception of war, [second] was a diplomatic  instrument  –  the  third  instrument  will  be  the  constitution  of  another fundamental  and  new  element,  which  is  the  deployment   of  a  permanent  military apparatus (dispositif) that comprises:  [first] professionalization of the soldier, setting-up  a  military  career; second,  a  permanent  armed  structure  that  can  serve  as  the framework  for  exceptional  wartime  recruitment;  third,  an  infrastructure  of  back-up facilities  of  strongholds  and  transport;  and  finally,  fourth,  a  form  of  knowledge,  a tactical  reflection  on  types  of  maneuver, schemas of  defense  and attack, in  short an entire  specific  and autonomous reflection  on  military matters and possible  wars. (305)

War is no longer a different aspect of human activity.   At a  given moment, war will mean bringing  into play  politically  defined resources, of which the military is one of the fundamental and constitutive dimensions.  We have then a political-military complex  that  is absolutely necessary to the  constitution of this European balance as a mechanism  of  security;  this  political-military   complex  will  be  continually  brought into play and war will be only  one of its functions.  [Thus we can understand]* that the relation between war and peace, between the military  and the civil, will be redeployed around this complex. (306)

29 march 1978

1) Police  will  also  be,  but  in  an  opposite direction,  as  it  were,  a  way  of  increasing  the  state’s  forces  to  the  maximum  while preserving  the state’s good order.   In one case,  the problem  of European  equilibrium has as its main objective  the  maintenance  of a  balance despite the growth of the state, as it were; in the  other,  the  problem  of police  is how to ensure  the maximum  growth of  the  state’s  forces  while  maintaining  good  internal  order.    So,  the  first  relation  is between police and European equilibrium. (314)

2) Second,  there  is  a  relation  of  conditioning,  for  at  the  end  of  the  sixteenth century  the  space  of  inter-state  competition  has  opened  out  considerably  and  taken over from dynastic rivalries, and it is quite clearly  understood that in this space of, not generalized  competition,  but  European  competition  between  states,  the  maintenance of equilibrium  is only gained insofar as each state  is able to increase  its own force to an  extent  such  that it is never  overtaken by  another  state. […]Each state must have  a  good police so as  to  prevent the  relation  of  forces  being  turned  to  its  disadvantage.    One  quickly arrives  at  the,  in  a  way,  paradoxical  and  opposite  consequence,  which  consists  in saying:  In the end, there will be imbalance if within the European equilibrium there is a  state,  not my state,  with bad  police. (314-315)

3) Finally,  third,  there  is  a  relationship   of  instrumentation  between  European equilibrium  and  police,  in  the  sense  that  there  is  at  least  one  common  instrument. This instrument common  to  European  equilibrium  and  the  organization  of  police  is statistics.  The effective preservation of European equilibrium  requires that each state is  in a  position,  first,  to  know its own  forces, and  second,  to  know  and  evaluate  the forces of the others, thus permitting a comparison that makes it possible to uphold and maintain  the  equilibrium. (315)

I  think  one  of  the  most  fundamental  and  typical  elements  of  what   will henceforth be understood by  “police” is this having  “man as the  true subject,”  and as the  true  subject of “something  to  which he  devotes himself,”  inasmuch  as he  has an activity  that must characterize  his perfection and thus make possible  the  perfection of the  state.   Police  is directed  towards men’s activity,  but insofar as this  activity  has a relationship  to  the  state. (322)

What is characteristic of a police state is its interest in  what  men  do;  it is interested  in  their  activity,  their  “occupation.”*     The objective of police is therefore  control of and responsibility for men’s activity insofar as  this  activity   constitutes  a  differential  element   in  the  development  of  the  state’s forces. (322)

Tasks of police:

1) The first concern of police will be the number of men, since, for men’s activity as  much  as  for  their  integration  within  a  state  utility,  it  is  important  to  know  how many  there are  and to ensure  that there are as many as possible.  The state’s strength depends on  the number of its inhabitants.    This thesis was already  formulated  in the Middle Ages and  was repeated throughout the sixteenth century, but it begins to take on a  precise  meaning  in the  seventeenth century  insofar  as  the  question  immediately arises  of  how  many   men  are  really   needed  and  what  the  relationship   should  be between  the  number  of  men  and the  size  of  the  territory,  and its  wealth,  for  the best and most  certain development of the state’s strength. (323)

2) The  second  object  of  police  is  the  necessities  of  life.    For  people  are  not enough,  they  must also  be  able  to live.   Consequently  police will  be  concerned with these  immediate  necessities.   First and  foremost, of course,  is the provision  of  food, the so-called basic needs. (324)

3) Here we touch on a  third objective of police.  After the number of people and the necessities of life  we come to the  problem of health.  Health becomes an object of police  inasmuch  as  health  is  also  a  necessary  condition  for  the  many  who  subsist thanks to  the  provision  of  foodstuffs  and bare  necessities,  so  that they can  work, be busy, and occupied.  So  health  is not just a problem  for  police  in  cases of epidemics, when  plague  is declared,  or  when  it is  simply  a  matter  of  avoiding  the  contagious, such  as  those  suffering  from  leprosy;  henceforth  the  everyday   health  of  everyone becomes a permanent object of police  concern and intervention. (324-325)

4) Finally, the  last object of police is circulation, the circulation of goods, of the products of  men’s  activity.    This circulation  should  be  understood  first  of  all  in  the sense of the material instruments with which it  must be provided.  Thus police will be concerned  with  the condition and  development  of roads, and with the  navigability of rivers and  canals, etcetera.   In his Traité de droit  public,  Donat devotes a chapter [to this question] which is called “Of  police,”  the full  title  being:   “Of police  for the  use of seas, rivers, bridges, roads, public squares, major routes and other public places.”*   So the space of circulation is a privileged object for police.†   But by  “circulation” we should understand not only this material network that  allows the circulation of goods and possibly  of men, but also the circulation itself, that is to say the set of regulations, constraints,  and  limits,  or  the  facilities  and  encouragements  that  will  allow  the circulation of men and things in the kingdom  and  possibly beyond its borders. (325)

Generally speaking,  what police  has to  govern,  its fundamental  object, is  all the  forms of, let’s say, men’s coexistence with each other.   It is the fact  that they  live together, reproduce, and that  each of them  needs a certain amount of  food  and  air to live, to subsist; it  is the fact that they  work alongside each other at different or similar professions,  and  also  that  they exist in  a  space  of  circulation;  to  use  a  word  that  is anachronistic  in  relation  to  the  speculations  of  the  time,  police  must  take responsibility  for  all  of  this  kind  of  sociality  (socialité).    The  eighteenth  century theorists will  say  this:   Police  is  basically  concerned  with  society.‡ (326)

So,  it  seems  to  me  that  the objective  of  police  is  everything  from  being  to  well-being,  everything  that  may produce  this  well-being  beyond  being,  and  in  such  a  way  that  the  well-being  of individuals is the state’s strength.(328)

5 april 1978

These  are the  institutions prior to police.  The  town  and  the road, the  market, and  the  road network feeding  the market.   Hence  the fact that in the seventeenth and eighteenth century police was thought  essentially  in terms of what could be called the urbanization of the territory.   Basically, this involved making  the  kingdom, the entire territory, into a sort of big  town; arranging things so that the territory  is organized like a town, on the model  of a town, and as perfectly  as a  town. (336)

that   you  can  also  see  that  police,  the establishment   of  police,  is  absolutely  inseparable  from  a  governmental  theory  and practice  that   is  generally  labeled  mercantilism,  that  is  to  say,  a  technique  and calculation  for  strengthening  the  power  of  competing  European  states  through  the development   of  commerce  and  the  new  vigor  given  to  commercial  relations. (337)

Police  and  commerce,  police  and  urban  development,  and  police  and  the development   of  all  the  activities  of  the  market  in  the  broad  sense,  constitute  an essential  unity  in  the  seventeenth  century  and  until  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth century.   Apparently, the development  of the market  economy, the multiplication and intensification of  exchanges  in the  sixteenth  century, and  the  activation of monetary circulation, all  introduced human existence  into the abstract and purely  representative world of the commodity and exchange value. )338)

However,  I  think  something  completely different  emerges  in  the  seventeenth  century  that  is  much  more  than  this  entry  of human  existence  into  the  abstract  world  of  the  commodity.    It  is  a  cluster  of intelligible  and  analyzable  relations  that allow  a  number  of  fundamental  elements to be  linked together  like  the  faces of a  single  polyhedron:    the  formation  of an  art of government  organized  by   reference  to  the  principle  of  raison  d’État;  a  policy   of competition  in  the  form  of the  European  equilibrium;  the  search  for a  technique  for the  growth of the  state’s forces†   by a  police  whose  basic  aim  is the  organization  of relations  between  a  population  and  the  production  of  commodities;  and  finally,  the emergence  of the  market town, with  all  the  problems of  cohabitation and circulation as problems falling  under the vigilance  of a good government according  to principles of raison d’État.  I don’t  mean that the market town was born at this time, but that the market town became  the  model of state intervention in men’s lives.  I think this is the

fundamental  fact  of  the  seventeenth  century,  at  any  rate  the  fundamental  fact characterizing  the  birth of police  in the seventeenth century. (338)

We are in the world of the regulation, the  world  of  discipline.**   That  is to say, the  great proliferation of local and regional disciplines we  have  observed in workshops, schools and the army  from the end of the sixteenth  to  the  eighteenth  century,††   should  be  seen  against  the  background  of  an attempt   at  a  general  disciplinarization,  a  general  regulation  of  individuals  and  the territory  of  the  realm  in  the  form  of  a  police  based  on  an  essentially  urban  model. Making  the  town  into a  sort of quasi-convent and the  realm  into a sort of quasi-town is  the  kind  of great disciplinary  dream  behind police.    Commerce,  town,  regulation, and  discipline  are, I think, the  most characteristic  elements of  police  practice as this was understood in the seventeenth century and the first  half of the eighteenth century.  This is what  I would like to have said last week had I had the full time to describe this great project of police. (340-341)

There  is a dis-urbanization  to  the  advantage  of  an  agrocentrism,  a  substitution,  or  emergence anyway,  of  the  problem  of  production  as  distinct   from  the  problem  of  marketing, which  is,  I  think, the  first major breach  in the  system  of  police  in the  sense  this was understood in the seventeenth century and at the start of the eighteenth century. (343)

Police  regulation  is pointless precisely because, as the analysis I have just been talking  about  shows, there is  a  spontaneous regulation  of  the  course  of  things.   Regulation is not  only harmful, even  worse  it  is pointless.    So  a  regulation  based  upon  and  in  accordance  with  the course of things themselves must replace a regulation by  police authority.  This is the second major breach opened up in the system of Polizei, of police. (344)

Within a certain time scale, the number of a population in a given  place  will  adjust  itself  according  to  the  situation  without  any  need  of intervention  through  regulations.    Population  is  not   therefore  an  indefinitely modifiable datum.  This is the third thesis. (345)

The good of all will be assured by  the behavior of each when the state,  the  government,  allows  private  interest  to  operate,  which,  through  the phenomena  of accumulation and regulation, will  serve  all.  The  state  is not therefore the  source of the good of each.  It is not a  case, as it was for police – as I was saying last week – of ensuring  that the better than just living  is utilized by  the state and then passed on as the happiness or well-being  of the totality.  It is now a matter of ensuring that  the state only  intervenes to regulate, or rather to allow the well-being, the interest of  each  to  adjust  itself  in  such  a  way  that  it  can  actually   serve  all.    The  state  is envisioned as the regulator of interests and no longer as the transcendent and synthetic principle  of the  transformation  of the  happiness  of  each  into  the  happiness of all. (346) – last four on the économistes

Economic  reason  does  not  replace  raison  d’État,  but  it  gives  it  a  new content and  so gives new forms to  state  rationality.   A new  governmentality  is  born with  the  économistes  more  than  a  century   after  the  appearance  of  that  other governmentality  in  the  seventeenth  century.    The  governmentality of  the  politiques gives us police, and the governmentality  of the  économistes introduces us, I think, to some of the fundamental lines of modern and contemporary governmentality. (348)

But  now,  naturalness  re-appears  with  the  économistes,  but  it  is  a  different naturalness.    It is the  naturalness of those  mechanisms that  ensure  that,  when prices rise,  if one allows this to happen, then  they  will  stop  rising  by  themselves.    It is the naturalness that ensures that  the population is attracted by  high wages, until a certain point at  which wages stabilize and as a  result  the population no longer increases.  As you can see, this is not at all  the  same  type  of  naturalness as  that of the  cosmos that framed and supported the governmental reason of the Middle Ages or of the sixteenth century.   It  is a  naturalness that is opposed precisely  to the  artificiality  of  politics, of raison d’État and police.  It is opposed to it, but in quite  specific and particular ways.  It is not the  naturalness  of  processes of nature  itself,  as the  nature  of the  world, but processes  of  a  naturalness  specific  to  relations  between  men,  to  what  happens spontaneously  when they cohabit, come  together, exchange, work, and produce [ … ]. That  is to say, it is a naturalness that  basically  did not exist until then and which, if not named  as  such,  at  least  begins  to  be  thought  of  and  analyzed  as  the  naturalness  of society. (349)

1) Civil  society  is what governmental  thought,  the  new form  of  governmentality   born  in  the  eighteenth  century,  reveals  as  the  necessary correlate  of  the  state.   (350)

2) The  second  point  is  that  in  this new  governmentality,  and  correlative  to  this horizon  of  social  naturalness,  you  see  the  appearance  of  the  theme  of  a  form  of knowledge  that is – I was going  to say, specific  to government, but this would not be entirely  exact.    What  are  we  actually  dealing  with  in  these  natural  phenomena  the économistes were talking about?  We are dealing  with processes that  can be known by methods  of  the  same  type  as  any  scientific  knowledge.    The  claim  to  scientific rationality,  which  was  absolutely   not  advanced  by   the  mercantilists,  is  assumed however  by the  eighteenth  century économistes,  who mean that  the  rule  of evidence must be  applied  in  these domains.†    Consequently,  these  methods are  not in any  way the sorts of calculations of forces, or diplomatic calculations, that raison d’État called upon  in  the  seventeenth  century.    The  knowledge  involved  must be  scientific  in  its procedures. (350)

3) The third important point in this new governmentality  is, of course, the sudden appearance of the  problem  of population in new forms.  Previously,  the  question was basically   not  so  much  one  of  population  as  of  populating  or,  on  the  contrary,  of depopulation; it was number, work, and docility,  all  that I have  already  talked about.  Now, however, population appears as a both specific and relative reality:  it is relative to  wages,  to  the  possibilities  of  work,  and  to  prices,  but  it  is  also  specific  in  two senses.  First, population has its own laws of transformation and movement,  and it is just as much  subject to  natural  processes  as wealth itself. […]In the  second half of the eighteenth century, taking  responsibility  for the population will involve  the  development  of,  if  not  sciences,  then  at  least  practices  and  types  of intervention.   These  will  include,  for  example,  social  medicine,  or  what at the  time was  called  public  hygiene,  and  it  will  involve  problems  of  demography,  in  short, everything  that  brings  to  light   the  state’s  new  function  of  responsibility   for  the population  in  its naturalness;  the  population as a  collection of subjects is replaced by the population as a set of natural phenomena. (351-2)

4) The  fourth major modification of governmentality is this:  What  does it  mean to  say   that  the  facts  of  population  and  economic  processes  are  subject  to  natural processes? […]It will be necessary  to arouse, to facilitate, and to laisser faire, in other words to manage and no longer  to  control  through  rules  and  regulations.    The  essential  objective  of  this

management will be not so much to prevent things as to ensure that the  necessary  and natural  regulations work, or even to create  regulations that enable natural regulations to  work.   Natural phenomena  will  have  to be framed in  such  a  way that they do not veer off course,  or  in  such  a  way that clumsy, arbitrary,  and  blind  intervention  does not  make  them  veer  off  course.    That  is  to  say,  it  will  be  necessary  to  set  up mechanisms  of  security.    The  fundamental  objective  of  governmentality   will  be mechanisms  of  security,  or,  let’s  say,  it will  be  state  intervention  with  the  essential function of ensuring  the  security of the  natural  phenomena  of  economic  processes or processes intrinsic to population. (352-353)

This  explains,  finally,  the  insertion  of  freedom  within  governmentality,  not only as  the  right of  individuals legitimately opposed  to  the  power,  usurpations,  and abuses  of  the  sovereign  or  the  government,  but  as  an  element  that  has  become indispensable to governmentality itself.  Henceforth, a  condition of governing  well  is that  freedom,  or  certain  forms  of  freedom,  are  really  respected.    Failing  to  respect freedom is not  only  an abuse of rights with regard to the law, it is above all ignorance of how to govern properly.  The integration of freedom, and the specific limits to this freedom within the field of governmental practice has now become an imperative. (353)

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