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Archive for May, 2012

John D. Caputo “Instants, Secrets, and Singularities”

Caputo, John D. 1995. Instants, Secrets, and Singularities: Dealing Death in Kierkegaard and Derrida. – Matuštik, Martin J.; Westphal, Merold (eds). Kierkegaard in Post/Modernity. Indiana University Press: 216-238.

[…] undecidability does not mean aesthetic indecision but supplies instead the condition of possibility of deciding, i.e., of taking a risk. (216)

So there are two levels of secrecy at work in the story: the secret that God keeps from Abraham, who does not know what God’s pleasure is; and the secret that Abraham keeps from Isaac and Sarah, from the servants who accompany him to Moriah, from family and friends, from anyone who would ask what he is doing, who do not know what the patriarh is up to, because he does not know himself. (220)

The sphere of absolute responsibility is beyond duty, because in doing one’s duty one is related to the universal, not God. So Abraham is beyond ethics, beyond duty qua duty, transcending Kantianism in favor of the religious, which is absolute duty, which means to be related to God. (221)

[…] „ethics“ […] means the calculability of obligation, allowing the power of the rationem reddere to hold sway over the question of obligation. (225)

Kierkegaard and Derrida, on the other hand, are willing to make the sacrifice of ethics; they think that obligation is an abyss, that any attempt to formulate such a wisdom of love, or of obligation, is caught up in aporia, scandal and paradox, that our duties clash in irreconcilable conflicts, awash in incommensurability. (225)

[…] if every other is infinitely other it would not be possible to distinguish the ethical as an order of generality that would then have to be sacrificed to the religious as an order of singularity. (228)

The Pauline-Christian economy culminates in the idea of an infinite, unpayable debt, of a state of guilt/indebtedness (Schuldigkeit) that is so vast and deep that only God Himself can pay Himself back. (232)

With the „kingdom of heaven“ the kingdom of God is given just the economic twist that Derrida exposes, even as Mathhew has also redacted „the poor“ (hoi ptochoi) into „poor spirit“ (pneumeati). (233)

Soren Kierkegaard “Kartus ja värin”

Kierkegaard, Soren 1998. Kartus ja värin. Meeliülendavad kõned. Tallinn: Vagabund.

Kartus ja värin (51-193)

Aabrahami teo eetiline iseloomustus on see, et ta tahtis Iisaki tappa, religioosne aga see, et ta tahtis Iisaki ohvriks tuua; ent just selles vastuolus peitubki äng, mis võib inimeselt une röövida, ja siiski pole Aabraham ilma selle ängita see, kes ta on. (79-80)

Kangelasse ma elan sisse, Aabrahami aga ei suuda ma sisse elada; niipea kui ma olen tema kõrguseni jõudnud, kukun ma alla, kuna see, mida mulle pakutakse, on paradoks. (83)

Aabraham uskus absurdi jõul; sest igasugune inimlik arvestus oli ju ammu lakanud olemast. (87)

[…] usu liikumist tuleb pidevalt sooritada absurdi jõul, kuigi muide nõnda, et inimene ei kaotaks sealjuures lõplikkust, vaid omandaks selle tervikuna. […] olles lõpmatuse liikumisega valmis saanud, sooritab ta lõpliku liikumised. (89)

Vaimses mõttes on kõik võimalik, aga lõplikkuse maailmas on paljud asjad võimatud. Rüütel muudab võimatu siiski võimalikuks, väljendades seda vaimsel tasandil, vaimses mõttes väljendab ta seda aga nii, et ütleb sellest lahti. (96-97)

Absurdne ei kuulu nende diferentside hulka, mis asuvad mõistuse hõlmamisulatuses. Ta pole samane ebatõenäolisega, ootamatuga, ettearvamatuga. […] Ta tunnetab niisiis võimatust, uskudes samal absurdi […] (100)

Ent usus, ütleb too imeline rüütel, usus saad sa ta endale absurdi jõul. (104)

[…] milline tohutu paradoks on usk; paradoks, mis suudab muuta mõrva pühaks ja Jumalale meelepäraseks teoks, paradoks, mis annab Aabrahamile Iisaki tagasi ja mida mõtlemine haarata ei suuda, kuna usk algab just nimelt sealt, kus lõpeb mõtlemine. (108-109)

Vahetult meelelises ja hingelises mõttes on üksik niisugune indiviid, kellel on üldises oma telos, ja tema eetiline ülesanne on iseennast lakkamatult selles väljendada, et oma individuaalsusest loobudes muutuda üldiseks. (110)

[…] üksik, kes on olnud kui üksik üldisele alluv, muutub nüüd üldise kaudu üksikuks, kes kui üksik on sellest ülem; et üksik kui üksik on absoluutsega seoses. (112)

Aabraham tegutseb absurdi jõul; sest absurdne on just see, et tema kui üksik on kõrgem kui üldine. […] Aabrahami suhe Iisakisse väljendub eetilises mõttes üsna lihtsalt nii, et isa peab armastama poega rohkem kui iseennast. (113)

Traagiline kangelane jääb ikka eetilise raamidesse. Tema laseb eetilisel väljendada oma telost eetilise kõrgemas väljendusvormis, taandades eetilise suhte isa ja poja või isa ja tütre vahel tundeks, mille dialektika kätkeb selle suhetes kõlblusideega. Sellepärast ei saa siin juttugi olla eetilise enda teleoloogilisest suspensioonist. (116)

Inimest viib ju kiusatusse enamasti see, mis takistab teda oma kohust täitmast, ent siin on kiusatus hoopis eetiline ise, mis hoiab teda tagasi Jumala tahet täitmast. Aga mis on siis kohustus? Kohustus on ju nimelt Jumala tahte väljendus. (117)

Niipea kui ma rääkima hakkan, väljendan ma üldist, ja kui ma seda ei tee, siis ei saa keegi minust aru. Niipea kui Aabraham tahaks väljenduda üldises, peaks ta ütlema, et tema olukord kujutab endast kiusatust, kuna tal pole mingit kõrgemat väljendust üldise kohta, mis seisaks kõrgemal üldisest, millest ta üle astub. (117)

See on paradoks, mille kaudu ta püsiv tipus, mida ta kellelegi teisele selgeks teha ei saa, sest paradoks seisneb selles, et tema kui üksik seab end absoluutsesse vahekorda absoluutsega. (119)

Traagiliseks kangelaseks võib inimene saada omal jõul, kuid usu rüütliks mitte. Kui inimene satub traagilise kangelase teatud mõttes raskele teele, siis võivad paljud talle nõu anda; sellele, kes käib usu kitsast rada, ei saa keegi nõu anda, teda ei suuda keegi mõista. (125)

Eetilise käsitluse kohaselt on üksiku ülesanne vabastada end seesmise meelevallast ja väljendada seda välise kaudu. […] Usu paradoks seisneb selles, et temas on välisega võrreldamatu seesmine, mis muide pole identne ka eelmainituga, vaid on uus seesmine. (128)

Usu paradoks on ju see, et üksik on kõrgem kui üldine, et üksik, kui meelde tuletada praeguseks haruldasemat dogmaatilist distinktsiooni, määratleb oma suhet üldisega oma suhetes absoluutsega, aga mitte suhet absoluutsega oma suhetes üldisega. […] kui see kohustus on absoluutne, siis on eetiline taandatud relatiivseks. (129)

Luukas 14,26: „Kui keegi tuleb minu juurde ja ei vihka oma isa ja ema ja naist ja lapsi ja vendi ja õdesid ja veel pealegi oma elu, see ei või olla mu jünger.“ (131)

Absoluutne kohustus võib sel juhul panna tegema seda, mida eetika keelaks, aga ta ei saa mingil juhul panna usu rüütlit loobuma armastamast. (134)

[…] arvamus, et üksikuna eksisteerida on üsna lihtne asi, sisaldab üpris kahtlast kaudset järeleandmist ka iseendale; sest see, kes tõepoolest endast lugu peab ja oma hinge pärast muretseb, on veendunud selles, et inimene, kes elab maailmas ihuüksi ja omaenda vastutusel, elab tegelikult rangemat ja suletumat elu kui tütarlaps neitsitornis. (135)

Traagiline kangelane resigneerub, et väljendada üldist, usu rüütel aga resigneerub üldisest, et muutuda üksikuks. […] ta teab, et on kohutav sündida üksildasena üldise rüpest […] Inimlikus mõttes on ta meeletu ega suuda end kellelegi arusaadavaks teha. (136-7)

Järelikult emb-kumb, kas on olemas absoluutne kohustus Jumala suhtes, ja kui see on olemas, siis on see eelpool kirjeldatud paradoks, et üksik kui üksik on kõrgem kui üldine ja kui üksik on ta absoluutses suhtes absoluutsega – või ei ole usku kunagi olemas olnud, kuna see on alati olemas olnud, või on siis ka Aabraham kadunud mees […] (142)

Kui pole olemas varjatust, mida põhjustab see, et üksik kui üksik on kõrgem kui üldine, siis ei saa Aabrahami käitumist kuidagi kaitsta; sest ta pole märganud eetilisi vaheinstantse. (143)

Igal pool, kus võib olla juttu äratundmisest, on eo ipso juttu eelnevast varjatusest. (145)

Eetikaga ei ole hea vaielda, kuna tal on puhtad kategooriad. Eetika ei rajane kogemusel […] Eetikas ei ole juhuseid, järelikult ei jõua ta seletusteni ega naljata väärtustega, ta paneb õblukese kangelase õlgadele tohutu vastutuse […] Esteetika nõudis järelikult varjatust ja tasus selle eest, eetika nõudis ilmutamist ja karistas varjatuse eest. (148)

Kui ta vaikib, siis võtab ta endale kui üksik vastutuse, kuna ta ei märka argumenti, mis võib tulla väljastpoolt. Seda ei saa tema kui traagiline kangelane teha; sest just sellepärast armastab teda eetika, et ta väljendab pidevalt üldist. (149)

Vaikimises on deemoni võljujõud; ja mida rohkem vaikitakse, seda kohutavamaks muutub deemon, aga vaikimine on ka jumaluse ja üksiku endassetõmbumine. (150)

Niisugused natuurid on juba loomu poolest paradoksis ja nad pole mingil juhul ebatäiuslikumad kui teised inimesed, ainult et nad kas saavad hukka deemonlikus paradoksis või päästetakse nad jumalikus. Inimesed on ajast aega rõõmustanud selle üle, et nõiad, härjapõlvlased, trollid jne on ebardid, ja vajeldamatu on see, et igal inimesel on kalduvus ebardit nähes kohe seostada seda kujutelmaga moraalsest rikutusest. (172)

[…] eetika ütleb: „Sa pead tunnistama üldist, ja seda tunnustad sa just nimelt rääkides, ja sul ei tohi olla üldise vastu kaastunnet.“ (178)

[…] ma võtsin kogu käesoleva uurimuse ette, et toetuda temale; mitte et Aabraham muutuks seeläbi mõistetavamaks, vaid selleks, et mittemõistmine muutuks ebakindlamaks; sest, nagu öeldud, Aabrahami ma ei mõista, vaid saan teda üksnes imetleda. (179)

Tõeliselt traagiline kangela ohverdab iseenda ja kõik, mis tal on, üldise nimel; tema teod, iga liikumine temas kuulub üldisele, ta on nähtaval, ja selle nähtavaloleku tõttu on ta eetika armastatud poeg. Aabrahamile see ei sobi; tema ei tee üldise jaoks midagi ja on varjatud. (180)

Aabraham vaikib – aga ta ei saa rääkida, selles seisnebki häda ja äng. Kui ma nimelt ei suuda end arusaadavaks teha, siis ma ei räägi, isegi kui ma räägiksin vahetpidamata nii ööl kui päeval. Nii ongi Aabrahami puhul. Ta võib öelda kõike; aga üht asja ei saa ta öelda, ja kuna ta ei saa seda öelda nii, et teised sellest aru saaksid, siis ta ei räägi. Kõnelemist leevendab see, et see tõlgib mind üldisesse. (181)

Aabraham ei saa rääkida; sest seda, mis selgitaks kõike, ta (arusaadaval viisil) välja öelda ei saa – et see on katusmus, sealjuures niisugune, kus kiusatuseks on eetiline. (183)

Ta ei ütle ebatõde, aga ta ei ütle ka üldse midagi; sest ta räägib võõrast keelt. (188)

[…] Aabrahami on küll võimalik mõista, kuid teda saab mõista vaid nii, nagu mõistetakse paradoksi. (189)

Nikolas Rose “Neurochemical Selves”

Rose, Nikolas 2003. Neurochemical Selves. Society 41(1): 46-59

We could term these “psychopharmacological” societies. They are societies where the modification of thought, mood and conduct by pharmacological means has become more or less routine. In such societies, in many different contexts, in different ways, in relation to a variety of problems, by doctors, psychiatrists, parents and by ourselves, human subjective capacities have come to be routinely re-shaped by psychiatric drugs. (46)

This is a point that should be born in mind: the increasing worldwide dependence of health services on commercial pharmaceuticals is not restricted to psychiatric drugs and much of the growth in this sector is in line with that in drugs used for other conditions. (48)

But despite the law suits, anti-psychotic drugs had become central to the rationale of deinstitutionalization in the United States by the midsixties and to the management of the decarcerated or never incarcerated-population. The gradual acceptance of the reality of tardive dyskinesia, of its prevalence, and of its causation by drug treatment could not reverse the policy or the use of the drugs. A dual strategy took shape. On the one hand, the pharmaceutical industry met with FDA to discuss how to label the propensity of their compounds to cause tardive dyskinesia. On the other hand, the search began for alternative drugs that would not produce such damaging side effects. This track would eventually lead to the marketing of the socalled “atypical neuroleptics.” But it also underpinned other attempts to engineer so-called “smart drugs” which could be said to directly target the neurochemical bases of the illness, or at least the symptoms, with the minimum of collateral damage. (50)

In this context, drug treatment outside hospital becomes the treatment of choice, although short-term, focused, behavioral or cognitive therapy may also be funded, designed to ensure that the patient has the insight to recognize that he or she is suffering from an illness, and hence to increase the likelihood of compliance with medication. (51)

The epidemic of prescribing for ADHD in the United States seems a pretty clear example of a “culture bound syndrome.” (52)

But other factors also need to be addressed. First, no doubt, these developments are related to the increasing salience of health to the aspirations and ethics of the wealthy West, the readiness of those who live in such cultures to define their problems and their solutions in terms of health and illness, and the tendency for contemporary understandings of health and illness to be posed largely in terms of treatable bodily malfunctions. Second, they are undoubtedly linked to a more profound transformation in personhood. The sense of ourselves as “psychological” individuals that developed across the twentieth century-beings inhabited by a deep internal space shaped by biography and experience, the source of our individuality and the locus of our discontents-is being supplemented or displaced by what I have termed “somatic individuality.” By somatic individuality, I mean the tendency to define key aspects of one’s individuality in bodily terms, that is to say to think of oneself as „embodied,” and to understand that body in the language of contemporary biomedicine. To be a “somatic” individual, in this sense, is to code one’s hopes and fears in terms of this biomedical body, and to try to reform, cure or improve oneself by acting on that body. At one end of the spectrum this involved reshaping the visible body, through diet, exercise, and tattooing. At the other end, it involves understanding troubles and desires in terms of the interior “organic” functioning of the body, and seeking to reshape that – usually by pharmacological interventions. While discontents might previously have been mapped onto a psychological space-the space of neurosis, repression, psychological trauma-they are now mapped upon the body itself, or one particular organ of the body-the brain. (54)

In this way of thinking, all explanations of mental pathology must “pass through” the brain and its neurochemistry – neurones, synapses, membranes, receptors, ion channels, neurotransmitters, enzymes, etc. Diagnosis is now thought to be most accurate when it can link symptoms to anomalies in one or more of these elements. And the fabrication and action of psychiatric drugs is conceived in these terms. Not that biographical effects are ruled out, but biography-family stress, sexual abuse-has effects through its impact on this brain. Environment plays its part, but unemployment, poverty and the like have their effects only through their impact upon this brain. And experiences play their part substance abuse or trauma for example-but once again, through their impact on this neurochemical brain. A few decades ago, such claims would have seemed extraordinarily bold-for many medicopsychiatric researchers and practitioners, they now seem “only common sense.” (57)

Where Foucault analyzed biopolitics, we now must analyze bioeconomics and bioethics, for human capital is now to be understood in a rather literal sense-in terms of the new linkages between the politics,  economics and ethics of life itself. (58)

We have seen that, in certain key respects, the most widely prescribed of the new generation of psychiatric drugs treat conditions whose borders are fuzzy, whose coherence and very existence as illness or disorders are matters of dispute, and which are not so much intended to “cure”-to produce a specific transformation from a pathological to a normal state-as to modify the ways in which vicissitudes in the life of the recipient are experienced, lived and understood. (58)

So the capitalisation of the power to treat intensifies the redefinition of that which is amenable to correction or modification. This is not simply blurring the borders between normality and pathology, or widening the net of pathology. We are seeing an enhancement in our capacities to adjust and readjust our somatic existence according to the exigencies of the life to which we aspire. (58)

The new neurochemical self is flexible and can be reconfigured in a way that blurs the boundaries between cure, normalization, and the enhancement of capacities. And these pharmaceuticals offer the promise of the calculated modification and augmentation of specific aspects of self-hood through acts of choice. (59)

An ethics is engineered into the molecular make up of these drugs, and the drugs themselves embody and incite particular forms of life in which the “real me” is both “natural” and to be produced. (59)

Edward J. Comstock “The End of Drugging Children”

Comstock, Edward J. 2011. The End of Drugging Children: Toward the Genealogy of the ADHD Subject. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 47(1): 44-69.

[…] over the course of the century, through new relations between knowledge, the body, and techniques and technolo-gies such as the drug test and brain scanning, ADHD emerged at the intersection of an ethi-cal knowledge and practice that reflects an emerging psychiatric power, but that cannot be reduced to the terms of social control. (45)

[…] the nosography through which the deviant subject was diagnosed relative to external moral/juridical values or standards is replaced over the course of the century within a shifting discourse on the body built around behavioral norms, where abnormal behaviors of any kind become a potential sign of ADHD. (45)

[…] the valuation of behavior is given a new basis in the “deepest” levels of the individual—where the individual represents the self as a subject of knowledge and rational investment, and where drugs work to establish our true identity. (46)

To begin with, the person with an attention deficit or hyperactivity did not occupy a positive identity as a “human kind” (e.g., Hacking, 1991; Hacking in Wasserman & Wachbroit, 2001); rather, these individuals were understood to have (heterogeneous) underlying psychological conflicts that resulted in antisocial behaviors that the drugs, alongside other therapeutic techniques, were meant to eradicate (deviancy in gen-eral). The focus was on behaviors, conformity, and institutional roles. (52)

The key word here is “adjustment”; Bradley was not anticipating a return to some more inherently normal or ideal self for his subjects, but rather a return to more socially normal (adjusted) behaviors and roles. Ultimately, the drug is used to treat behavior—in the first instance to eliminate socially unacceptable behaviors— providing the conditions under which one can do better in school. But drugs only work in this regard by temporarily eliminating unwanted behaviors, not by addressing an underlying disorder. (53)

Indeed, it was not until the 1950s, and the invention and diffusion of chlorpromazine in psychiatric institutions, that some psychiatrists would begin to claim drugs as something like a cure (or at least a medical treatment) for mental disorders. (53)

But for the purposes of the genealogy of ADHD and the medicating of behavior disorders, the major significance of Bradley’s work is in shifting the nature of the problem from behaviors as a sign of an organic or metaphysical deficiency, to behaviors as the problems themselves. To wit, shortly following Bradley, hyperactivity becomes not a sign of minimal brain dysfunction or organic pathology, but a “disorder” of its own: hyperkinesis. And for the first time drugs are used in processes meant to produce behaviors and identities, rather than solely to eradicate immoral behaviors owing to moral concern.13 As institutionalized practices of power created new possibilities for managing and producing behaviors, the subject of knowledge shifts accordingly. (55)

[…] while Bradley and the experimental psychologists understood stimulant medication to work precisely through the emotional effect of the “drugging” of the child and the “sense of stimulation, well-being, and confidence” that the drug imparts (Bradley & Bowen, 1941, p. 101), now it is understood that the drugs “stabi-lize the brain” and normalize biological “function,” making the most inner and essential mental processes of the child “more normal” (Oettinger, 1971, p. 163). What an incredible reversal! (56)

In part, no doubt, we see here a shift in theoretical models—the passing from behaviorism to cognitivism as the en vogue theory of child development in education and psychology. However, at a more fundamental level, this shift can be attributed to the emergence of a new body—a new human nature made intelligible in part by positing a universal functioning of the individual as naturally self-interested and entrepreneurial. (56)

The difference is that by the time of the Johns Hopkins studies in the early 1960s, “usefulness” and “improvement” are not simply articulated relative to external social norms—norms derived from ethical and institutional custom and law—but instead these developmental concepts are elaborated in relation to norms of behavior itself at the level of the individual. (57)

By establishing the brain as the material cause and principle of intelligibility of behaviors in this way, there is a direct relationship between the brain—which “functions” in knowable ways according to a transcendental human program—and behaviors, rather than anbimplied and generic relationship between a physiological abnormality and behavioral abnormality. In this new configuration, behaviors lose their absolute value and are now only intel-ligible by relating them back to the individual (who is reducible to a brain) and the transcendental economical/rational brain program that caused them. In other words, within this circular and self-confirming system of knowledge, behaviors, given this organic basis, can now be viewed and codified in terms of their functionality at the level of the individual rather than in terms of their institutional/moral quality. (58)

[…] in many “official” versions of knowledge, these technologies would help give ADHD the status of a differentially diagnosed neurological disorder, and thus the hard-science status of pathological anatomy and true illness. (59)

The norm, in this regard, is no longer simply mapped on top of the sovereign and juridical as it applies to a universal trajectory of human development (the social norm). By the mid-century, as the culmination of a discourse on deviancy and the body that had emerged years before, the tech-nique of “the norm” becomes freely applied to any and all human behavior by way of anal-ogy to normal and abnormal physical “functions.” As a result, for example, deficiency in attention can become in and of itself a disorder. (59)

So it was through analogy that the deviant was linked to the pathological, as norms of behavior were assumed to reflect norms of the body and by proxy the inherited code of the species—morality and law were inscribed in the disciplinary body through the inherited human nature (which, of course, the deviant deviated from). (60)

At this point, to be medically abnormal, one had to first be socially abnormal, and the power of moral law and custom always preceded medical power. (60) -> No longer referring to social deviancy  per se, these mental technicians were able link identity to the “normal” or expected response to the drugs themselves, thus making the analogy itself—the major issue psychiatric power had to overcome to insinuate itself in the institutions—invisible. (60)

But perhaps most importantly, because psychotropic drugs replace institutional moral and juridical norms as the test for this behavior disorder, the new disorder could be found in anybody and in any behaviors based no longer on these norms but on the reaction to the drug in relation to a synthetic ideal of behavior. The fact that the drugs “work” in making the individual function better is often enough. And in this process, by bridging the gap between behaviors and the body, psychotropic drugs establish an ostensible  causative relation to appear between brain and behavior, where before (at least in cases where no physical pathology was evident) there was only an analogical relation between behavior and body. (61)

Once it was understood that brain function was at issue with ADHD, the use of medications was given its final justification as the best way to reach the disorder itself. The seeming “paradox” of drug effects on the ADHD-type could be reconciled—without resorting to an explanation that referenced the euphoric dimensions of the drug—by recognizing that stimulants allowed the brain to function more normally, more naturally. (62)

Now, for example, instead of referring to the abstract con-cepts of happiness or discontent, one could reduce these things to the “pleasure center” in the brain and speak of the quality and character of mental representations, and then use EEG technologies as empirical evidence. Hyperactivity, rather than belonging to an organic defect, becomes reducible to the firing of synapses—and therefore can become in and of itself an abnormality. (62)

[…]I believe that normality itself finds its basis in a “pure” discourse (and a tech-nology) that has the effect of opening up all behaviors to normalization techniques. (63)

Drugs become a test of the pathology in question. They work not only through the eradication of behaviors, but in the production of entirely new identities that extend from these tests. We see here a kind of inversion of the relationship between the norm, drugs, and identity compared to the relationship we saw with Bradley. (63) As the basis of the norm shifts from social external standards to the “deep” spaces of individuality, the individual him/herself replaces a universal social reality as the principle of a knowledge of behaviors. (63)

behaviors are now only given value in relation to the complex interplay of the volitional self, environmental context, and the particular biological/developmental needs and limitations of the individual. And whereas before only illegal and immoral behaviors were viewed as symptoms of a developmental disorder, where behaviors themselves were the sign and  the symptom of the disorder, by the late mid-twentieth century all behaviors become potential symptoms of the malfunctioning organism. (64)

Whereas before one was normal with respect to an ontological discourse based on the absolute construct of morality and the universally applicable social contract, now, freed from this discourse, science bases its new mode of seeing and knowing on nothing but a discourse on human behavior itself. I believe that this was the final transformation or rupture in the intelligibility of the human body during the twentieth century. In the shifts within the discourse on the ADHD-type, we can see a compelling example of an entirely new, nonreciprocal, intelligibility or dispotif of the body that emerged over the course of the century around the enterprising and self-interested individual, Homo economicus. (66)

The goal is no longer to identify deviant individuals or to control deviant behaviors—both of which extend from an intelligibility that ascribes absolute (moral) value to behaviors—but to produce new possibilities of behavior and identity bychanging the ethical relationship Man has with him/herself. (67)