Sebastian Rand “Organism, normativity, plasticity”

Rand, Sebastian 2011. Organism, normativity, plasticity: Canguilhem, Kant, Malabou. Continental Philosophy Review, 44(4): 341-357.

[…] the organism itself is the only available authority for the establishment of its biological norm. The pathological is not to be thought of as logically posterior to the physiological, but as that through which the physiological (as normal function) first announces itself; the normal only becomes distinct from the pathological when the functioning or activity of the organism orients itself toward leaving a current devalued state and achieving a valued different state. The name for an organic functioning or activity that is not normal, and that has normalcy as its goal (even if this goal is not achieved), is ‘‘pathology.’ (344)

It is the disease, as reaction, that first establishes the very normality or normative activity of the healthy state from which it is the departure. In this sense, ‘‘disease is not merely the disappearance of a physiological order but the appearance of a new vital order,’’ the establishment of a new norm. (344)

Canguilhem does notclaim that there is some original healthy state the re-achievement of which, or the return to which, is the true stable goal of the organism’s activity. The aim of the activity of the living is not the restitution of an original state, but ‘‘repairs which are really physiological innovations.’’ It is in this sense that ‘‘there is no disorder, there is the substitution for an expected or loved order of another order which either makes no difference or from which one suffers.’’ (345)

[…] subordinate variety of normativity can also look like a potential basis for a reduction of all organic normativity to norm-following normativity alone. On such a reductive approach, the alleged norm-establishing capacity of an organism is really just an ability to change themeansit employs to achieve an endnot itself selected by the organism; the various norms the organism is capable of establishing would thus all be subordinate technical tools for conforming to some ultimately authoritative norm established for the organism from the start. (345)

In claiming that there is an ‘‘original normative character of life’’ and that ‘‘life is a normative activity,’’ Canguilhem is claiming that the norm-guided and norm-establishing activity of the organism indeed aims at a supreme, fixed good: the preservation and expansion of the organism’s normestablishing capacity as such. (346)

On the one hand, norm-following can only count as such if the organism must act to keep itself in conformity with the norm; but it only needs to do so if it is violating it. Similarly, norm-establishing occurs precisely in reaction to the failure of the organism to maintain the already-established norm. Thus both normfollowing and norm-establishing are activities in response to violations of given conditions. (348)

[…] it is not just one or another norm that is subject to violation, but the animal’s norm-establishing itself that can be tested. Thus, whatever positive character we might have been inclined to attribute to norm-establishing normativity is now wholly eliminated by Canguilhem, in favor of a conception of normativity on which the condition of possibility for organic normativity in general is the possibility of failure. (349)

[…] the ‘‘finality’’ of the norm—its unifying function in relation to the organism and organism’s activity—is not a ‘‘real ontological finality’’ that would replace the ‘ought’ of the norm with an ‘is’ and convert Canguilhem’s position into a traditional teleological metaphysics; it is rather only ‘‘a possible, operative finality.’’ It is thus a normativity that can serve its organism-constituting function only by being removed from natural existence. And in fact, this removal of normativity from the natural realm—in the midst of an effort to demonstrate precisely an ‘‘original normative character of life’’—is not just (and perhaps only metaphorically) spatial, but temporal as well. (350)

Ontologically speaking, the norm that is violated does not exist at all, on Canguilhem’s view, and so certainly does not preexist its violation; at best it is only retroactively established by the organism itself as having-been-in-force just when it is violated, that is, when the organism establishes a new norm in its place. In other words, Canguilhem’s recourse to a conception of the norm or rule as essentially non-real, non-actual, non-present allows him to claim that the norm violatedwill have beenin effect just in case another, different norm is established later. Thus, the norm-establishing activity of the organism establishes both which norm was violated and which norm is in force now; such temporally non-natural ordering can be attributed to the autonomy of the organism only to the extent that it is itself essentially constituted by a relation to the non-natural. (350)

[…] organic autonomy seems to involve a temporal ordering unlike anything in nature. Thus, Canguilhem grounds his account of natural life and normativity ‘‘in the fullest sense’’ in the organism’s essential relation to what is non-existent, that which is beyond nature, that which cannot be confronted as an objectwithinthat experience, that which cannot be observed. The natural organism is essentially normative if and only if the normative is essentially non-natural. And while he may in this way have accomplished Kant’s first goal—to show that the life sciences have so far depended on values and norms they themselves tried to exclude from their ken—he has taken the rest of the Kantian path as well—in agreeing that norms as such cannot be found within nature—and so does not present a genuine alternative to its transcendental picture. (351)

[Malabou] understands ‘plasticity’ as designating a threefold capacity: the ability to receive form (as in the plasticity of clay), the ability to give form (as in the plasticity of the plastic arts), and the ability to destroy form (as in the French verb ‘plastiquer,’ meaning ‘to blow up’). (351)

[…] while Canguilhem’s organism is capable of receiving content (that is, natural changes in its bodily state and the environment), it is not capable of receiving a new form—it is defined as that which manifests itself as extra-natural norm-establishing form in the face of any and all received natural content. Conceived of as ‘‘plastic,’’ by contrast, the organism not only gives form to a content, but can give itself form and receive form in a way that changes what it is: it subjects itself as normestablishing to the possibility of transformation of its normativity, at its own hands or at the hands of something outside it. Thus, plastic normativity goes beyond Canguilhem’s organic normativity (and beyond his Kantian antecedents) by insisting on the capacity to have its own form destroyed. (355)

Put ontologically, Malabou has used destructive plasticity, the exposure of the organism to constancy-changing or form-changing accident, to bring organic normativity back within the realm of nature. Rather than seeing this exposure to destruction or deformation or transformation as a threat to the biological autonomy of the organism, as Canguilhem does, Malabou integrates this possibility into the concept of being as such. (355)

To be open to genuine change in form, and thus to destruction, is not to display a lack of autonomy and constancy, but rather to display one’s plasticity. Something like this is what Canguilhem was after: a conception of the organism as having its very being in its alterability. But he saw this alterability as ultimately a self-transformability, rather than a susceptibility to an outside influence or force, and thus conceived of it as a sovereignty of extra-natural form over natural content. (355)

Jeremy Proulx “Nature, Judgment and Art: Kant and the Problem of Genius”

Proulx, Jeremy 2011. Nature, Judgment and Art: Kant and the Problem of Genius. Kant Studies Online: 27-53.
In §46 of the Critique of Judgment Kant defines genius as ‘the innate [angebornes] mental predisposition [Gemütsanlage] (ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to art.’ (27)
If art is to be considered beautiful – if fine art is to be possible – then it must in some way be ‘natural’. Kant needs a conception of artistic genius that can account for art objects that are at once products of artistic intention and yet conceal this intention by appearing as necessary products of natural mechanism. (27)
[…] I will argue that since Kant seems to understand the genius’ connection to nature as a relationship in which creativity mirrors nature’s original productivity, the peculiar talent of the genius lay in an ability to find ‘natural’ expression for aesthetic ideas. (29)
‘[A]rt,” so the famous passage goes, ‘can be called fine [schön] art only if we are conscious that it is art while yet it looks to us like nature.’ Art is at once an opus of the artist and an effectus of natural fecundity (Fruchtbarkeit). The special relationship between the genius and nature is here explained by pointing out that on Kant’s model of aesthetic appreciation nature is the paradigm case of beauty, so that if art can be called beautiful at all it is only insofar as it appears as a natural product. (30)
[…] Kant wavers between the more radical claim that genius can produce natural effects and the claim that art is always guided by the intentions of the artist. For if art is just an opus, then the artist must employ a judgment of taste to ensure that his intentions are communicable to others. (33)
I suggest that the tension between genius and taste is not evidence of ambiguity (at least not only ambiguity) on Kant’s part, but is rather a tension internal to genius itself […] (33)
There are three basic ways that Kant defines genius: 1) originality; 2) exemplarity and communicability; and 3) naturalness. (34)
Genius is a natural phenomenon, a result of nature’s original productivity. Kant’s term in the third Critique is ‚Naturgabe’. ‘Art,’ so Kant’s reflection continues, ‘is like a garden, in which everything happens according to a method […]’. Genius is the avenue through which nature becomes subject to rules that have their origin in human reason. On this conception, fine art is a mediated form of nature itself. (35)
A necessary condition for fine art is thus 1) that nature acts through the genius, and 2) that it is this natural force that is the source of creativity. (35)
Kant, 1772-1773: ‘Not the imitation of nature, but rather the original fruitfulness of nature is the ground of beautiful art.’ (36)
So when Kant identifies the artistic genius with nature, he seems to mean: 1) that artistic beauty, just like natural, can be given at least a partial explanation in terms of determinate concepts; and 2) that such a mechanical explanation cannot explain the beauty that results from what on some level at least seems to be governed by determinate rules. (37)
But simply cobbling together conceptual components does not make a fine work of poetry just like any old natural form does not amount to natural beauty. The artistic genius may create ‘another nature out of the material that actual nature gives’, but this is more than simply putting together elements according to the laws of the understanding because, as Kant says, the work of genius must proceed without the guidance of any rule. (37)
To be ingenious is to expand concepts by creating new associations, new connections between concepts that expand the concepts themselves. Kant uses the example of the concept of the sublimity and majesty of creation. (37-38)
The talent of the genius consists in the ability to find ‘natural’ expression for such concepts, an expression that, while completely novel, completely unpredictable, seems to follow necessarily from what we mean by a concept. In this, we can understand what Kant means when he requires that fine art is both original and exemplary: art must be new, but it cannot be nonsense, it must serve as an example. A great work of art strikes us as original; it gives us a new, exemplary aesthetic way to think a concept. (38)
The peculiar talent of the genius consists in the ability to render a rational concept in such a way that it strikes us as ‘natural’, a necessary implication of the concept. (38-39)
To create art is quite literally to create another nature, a nature populated by ideas that exceed the bounds of sense, and held together by the aesthetic ingenuity that yet finds a sensible expression to capture such ideas. (39) – „a nature of ideas”
In reflective judgment, the order of operations from apprehension to comprehension to exhibition is short-circuited because that which is apprehended (beauty) resists comprehension. (40)
Before the third Critique, Kant had always maintained that imagination and understanding take on a relation of cooperation that unifies a manifold into a structured object. Now we learn that imagination and understanding can take on a new relation, a relation characterized by ‘harmonious free play’ rather than cooperation. This means that the typical relationship between imagination and understanding – the relationship in which imagination provides content that the understanding logically comprehends – is unhinged; that is, the imagination is no longer bound to the laws of the understanding, leaving its manifold free from the conceptual rule of the understanding and consequently from the imposition of determinative judgment. (40)
Without going into any of the necessary details, reflective judgment is not concerned to exhibit some concept of this state of the freedom of the imagination, but rather to reflect on it. The object of reflection is not, then, some object of experience (for to be an object at all in the Kantian sense is to be conceptually determined) but rather the purposive relation between imagination and understanding itself. (41)
In the case of empirical cognition, the relationship between imagination and understanding is purposive in that its purpose is to determine an object by exhibiting a concept that fits a given manifold. When confronted with the beautiful, this purpose of determining an object to be an instance of a concept is replaced by a purposiveness without a purpose because while the purpose of concept exhibition is absent, the purposive relation itself remains. That which is apprehended, though it cannot be comprehended, still harmonizes with the understanding. (41)
In the case of the experience of the sublime, the imagination is given even more freedom in that it is charged with the task of coming up with some supersensible meaning for what is a purely sensible given content. But when it comes to Kant’s account of artistic genius, imagination is charged with the even more challenging task of coming up with a sensible version of a supersensible idea. (43)
Indeed, Kant claims that artistic genius is characterized by an ‘ability to exhibit aesthetic ideas’, and defines an aesthetic idea as ‘the counterpart (pendant) of a rational idea’. A rational idea is a concept that cannot be exhausted by any intuition; an aesthetic idea is an imaginative presentation that cannot be thought determinatively. An aesthetic idea gives sensible life to that which is purely rational. (44-45)
An aesthetic idea is, as Kant says, a ‘presentation of the imagination’ that exceeds any possible determination by concepts. (45)
It is striking that Kant’s understanding of ‘spirit’ is so similar to the function of concept exhibition that he assigns to determinative judgment. Just as the latter is charged with the task of exhibiting a concept that the understanding comprehends out of an apprehended manifold of imagination, the function of spirit is to exhibit a rational concept in an aesthetic way, as an aesthetic idea. “When the imagination is used for cognition,” Kant says, “then it is under the constraint of the understanding […] [b]ut when the aim is aesthetic, then the imagination is free.” (48)
That which is presented in the imagination is conceptually grasped and determined by judgment to be an instance of a concept. The process of creativity on the other hand moves from reason to imagination to judgment. Here, the process begins with a rational concept or an idea that needs to find expression. (48)
So art is beautiful only when it is natural; only when, that is, it employs judgment to arrive at an expression that is meaningful to others and that gives aesthetic life to ideas that for most of us are only rational. And just as nature is not some inconceivable jumble, if art is to be successful in communicating a supersensible idea, then it is necessary that it too cannot be an inconceivable jumble; it is necessary, in short, that it be subject to a judgment of taste. (49)
“Taste,” Kant says, “is the basis of judging, genius however of execution.” The idea here seems to be that genius is the creative force behind the work, while taste makes the judgments that keep the work within the realm of comprehensibility. Thus, Kant continues,
“[T]aste without genius brings dissatisfaction with oneself; […] in contrast, much genius brings crude yet valuable products.” (50)
Kant: „Genius is not some sort of demon that gives out inspirations and revelations. If genius is to have matter, then one must have learned much or formally and methodically studied. Genius is also not a special kind and source of insight; it must be able to be communicated and made understandable to everyone. Genius only comes in where talent and industry do not reach; but if the illuminations presented amant obscurum and do not want to be seen and examined in the light at all, when they do not yield any graspable idea: then the imagination is raving, and, since its product is nothing (Nichts ist), it has not arisen from genius at all, but is only an illusion (Blendwerk).” (51-52 – Notes and Fragments, 15:393, 899.)
I shall conclude simply by pointing out that all of this supports the interpretation that genius is not some separate faculty, but rather a manner in which the faculties are set into motion. Kant makes this point explicitly in a reflection from 1776-78: “Genius […] is a principium of the animation of all the other powers through whatever idea of objects one wants.” And in the Anthropology Kant claims that genius, talent and spirit constitute a certain animation of the faculties. (52)

Immanuel Kant “Mis on Valgustus?”

Kant, Immanuel 1990. Kostmine küsimusele: Mis on Valgustus? Akadeemia 4: 801-809.

Valgustus on inimese väljumine tema omasüülisest alaealisusest. (801)

On ju nii mugav olla alaealine. Oleks mul aru asemel raamat, südametunnistuse asemel hingekarjane, minu enda asemel kirjutaks mulle eluviisi ette arst jne, siis poleks mul tarvis end üldse vaevata. (801)

Revolutsiooni läbi võib küll ehk teoks saada vabanemine rõhumisest, kuid mitte ealeski mõtlemisviisi tõeline reforn; vaid uued eelarvamused saavad arutule inimkarjale niisamasugusteks juhtohjadeks, nagu olid seda vanad. (803)

Sellise valgustuse tarvis on nõutav üksnes vabadus, ei miski muu; ja just ohutuim kõigest sellest, mida iganes võib tähendada vabadus, nimelt: oma mõistuse igas suhtes avalik tarvitus. (803)

[…] oma mõistuse avalik tarvitus peab olema vaba igal ajal, ja ainult see saab inimeste seas valgustust teoks teha; samas võib mõistuse eratarvitus sageli olla vägagi rangelt piiratud, seejuures valgsutuse edenemist oluliselt takistamata. Aga omaenese mõistuse avaliku tarvituse all mõistan ma seda, mida keegi selle abil teeb õpetlasena kogu publiku kui lugejaskonna ees. Eratarvituseks nimetan seda, mida üksikisik võib oma mõistusega teatud temale usaldatud tsiviilametis või –teenistuskohas teha. (803-804)

Ükski ajastu ei saa enesele kohuseks võtta ja seda tõotada, mis seaks järeltuleva olukorda, kus tal oleks võimatu edendada (eelkõige nii hädavajalikke) omaenda teadmisi, puhastuda eksitustest ja üldse valgustuses edasi minna. See oleks kuritegu inimloomuse vastu, mis on algselt määratletud just selles edasiminekus […] (806)

Kuid ka ainult see, kes ise valgustatuna varju ei karda, samas aga käsutab avaliku rahu tagamiseks hästi distsiplineeritud arvukat väge, võib öelda seda, mida ei tohi söandada vabariik: arutlege niipalju kui tahate ja mille üle tahate – ainult kuulake sõna! Nii ilmneb siin võõrastav, inimlike asjade ootamatu käik; kui vaadata üldiselt, siis on ju paradoksaalne peaaegu kõik. Kodanikuvabaduste suurem määr näib rahva vaimu vabadusele soodus olevat, kuid paneb sellele siiski ületamatu tõkke; sellest vähem määr seevastu loob ruumi vaimu arenemiseks kõigi oma võimete kohaselt. Kui loodus on kõva kesta all valla päästnud eo, mille eest ta kõige hellemalt hoolitseb, nimelt kalduvuse ja kutsumuse eest vabalt mõelda, siis sellel on vähehaaval tagasimõju rahva meelsusele (misläbi see saab järk-järgult tegutsemisvabaduse-võimelisemaks) ning lõpuks isegi selle valitsuse põhimõtteile, kes peab iseendale kasutoovaks kohelda inimest inimese vääriliselt, sest ta on enam kui masin. (808-809)

Gilles Deleuze “Kanti kriitiline filosoofia”

Deleuze, Gilles 2011. Kanti kriitiline filosoofia. Tartu: Ilmamaa.

 

III peatükk – Võimete suhe „Otsustusjõu kriitikas“

Tundevõime saab olla kõrgem ainult siis, kui tema printsiip on huvitu. Tähtis ei ole mitte esindatava objekti olemasolu, vaid lihtsalt esinduse mõju mulle. See tähendab, et kõrgem mõnu on puhta otsustuse, puhta otsustuste tegemise meeleline väljendus. See otsustuste tegemine esineb kõigepealt „see on ilus“ tüüpi esteetilises otsustuses. (63)

[…] kuna otsustus ei suuda olla seadustandev esemete kohta, saab ta olla vaid heautonoomne, s.t. seadustandev iseenda kohta. Tundevõimel pole valda (ei nähtumused ega asjad iseeneses); ta ei väljenda tingimusi, millele mingit laadi esemed peavad olema allutatud, vaid üksnes subjektiivseid tingimusi võimete rakendamiseks. (64)

Esteetiline ühismeel ei esinda võimete objektiivset kooskõla (s.t. esemete allutatust valitsevale võimele, mis määraks samas ära teiste võimete rolli nende esemete suhtes), vaid puhast subjektiivset harmooniat, kus kujutlusjõud ja aru toimivad spontaanselt, kumbki omal käel. Nii et esteetiline ühismeel ei täienda kaht ülejäänut, vaid ta annab neile aluse ehk teeb nad võimalikuks. (66)

[…] kujutlusjõu ja mõistuse kooskõla pole lihtsalt eeldatud: ta on tõepoolest genereeritud, tekitatud kooskõlatuses. (68)

Aga milles võib siinkohal seisneda mõistuslik huvi? See ei saa käia ilu enese kohta. See käib üksnes looduse soodumuse [aptitude] kohta tekitada ilusaid vorme, s.t. vorme, mis on võimelised kujutluses peegelduma. (70)

Sellest rakenduses saadav mõnu on ise huvitu; kuid me tunneme mõistuslikku huvi looduse sünnitiste sattumusliku kooskõla vastu meie huvitu mõnuga. (71)

Niimoodi ongi Ideed kaudselt esitatud looduse vabades mateeriates. Seda kaudset esitamist nimetab Kant sümbolismiks, ja selle reegliks on iluhuvi. (72) ilu ise on hüve sümbol (Kant, 73)

Kõik tugineb mõttele, et ilu on loonud loodus. Sellepärast näibki, et kunstis pole ilul hüvega mingit pistmist ning et ilumeelt kunstis ei saa genereerida printsiibi järgi, mis määrab meid olema kõlbelised. Sellest Kanti ütelus: austusväärne on see, kes väljub muuseumist ja pöördub looduse poole … (73)

Aga aru ei määra kunagi aprioorselt ära nähtumuse ainet, reaalse kogemuse üksikasju ega ühe või teise eseme üksikseadusi. Neid tunnetatakse ainult empiiriliselt ja nad jäävad meie aru suhtes sattumuslikuks. (80)

[…] arhetüüp-aru väljendab üht meie arule omast tunnust, nimelt meie võimetust määrata ise üksikut, meie võimetust käsitada nähtumuste eesmärgilist ühtsust mõne muu printsiibi järgi kui kavatsuslik põhjustamine ülima põhjuse poolt. Just selles mõttes muundabki Kant põhjalikult dogmaatilist lõpmatu aru mõistet: arhetüüpne aru väljendab lõpmatuses veel ainult meie arule omast piiri – punkti, kus see lakkab olemast seadustandev meie spekulatiivse huvi enda raames ja nähtumuste suhtes. (81)

Erinevalt mõistuse Ideest on looduseesmärgi mõistel antud ese; erinevalt arumõistest ei määra ta oma eset. Tegelikult on ta vajalik selleks, et võimaldada kujutlusjõul eset määramatult „reflekteerida“, nii et aru „omandadab“ mõisted vastavalt mõistuse enese Ideedele. […] Ja ümberpöördult, looduseesmärgi mõistest lähtudes me määrame mõistuse Idee eseme. (82)

Me ei leia loodusest kavatsuslikke jumalikke eesmärke, vaid me hoopis lähtume eesmärkidest, mis on kõigepealt looduse omad, ja lisame neile kavatsusliku jumaliku põhjuse Idee kui nende mõistmise tingimuse. Me ei sunni loodusele „vägivaldselt ja diktaatorlikult“ eesmärke peale, vaid me hoopis reflekteerime looduse eesmärgilist ühtsust, mida mitmekesisuses empiiriliselt tunnetatakse, et tõusta ülima põhjuse Ideeni, mis on määratud analoogia põhjal. (82-83)

Tuleb silmas pidada, et esteetiline otsustus ilmutab juba ehtsat eesmärgipärasust. Kuid see eesmärgipärasus on subjektiivne ja vormiline ning välistab igasuguse eesmärgi (nii objektiivse kui subjektiivse). (83)

Looduse aineline soodumus ei moodusta looduseesmärki (mis oleks vastuolus eesmärgita eesmärgipärasuse ideega): „on soosing, millega meie loodust vastu võtame, ei ole soosingut, mida tema meile osutaks.“ (84)

Kui vaadelda teleoloogilist otsustusjõudu, siis näeme hoopis teistsugust arusaama eesmärgipärasusest. Nüüd on tegemist eesmärgipärasusega, mis on objektiivne ja aineline ning kätkeb eesmärke. Siin valitseb looduseesmärgi mõiste, mis väljendab empiiriliselt asjade eesmärgilist ühtsust oma mitmekesisuse suhtes. (84)

Nende kahe [teleoloogilise ja esteetilise] otsustusjõu erinevus seisneb järgmises: teleoloogiline otsustusjõud ei viita erilistele printsiipidele (välja arvatud tema tarvituses ehk rakenduses). […] Esteetiline formaalne eesmärgipära „valmistab meid ette“ moodustama eesmärgimõistet, mis lisandub eesmärgipärasuse mõistele, täiendab seda ja käib looduse kohta; see on mõisteta refleksioon, mis valmistab meid ette moodustama refleksioonimõistet. (85)

Seega tuleb mõelda nii, et reflekteeriv otsustusjõud üldse teeb võimalikuks ülemineku tunnetusvõimelt ihavõimele, spekulatiivselt huvilt praktilisele huvile, ja valmistab ette esimese allutamist teisele, samal ajal kui eesmärgipärasus teeb võimalikuks ülemineku looduselt vabadusele ehk valmistab ette vabaduse teostumist looduses. (86)

 

Kokkuvõte: Mõistuse eesmärgid

Kanti võimeteõpetuse originaalsus seisneb järgmises: võimete kõrgem vorm ei abstraheeri neid kunagi nende inimlikust lõplikkusest ega kaota ka nende loomuserinevust. Just spetsiifiliste ja lõplikena küündivad võimed esimese tähenduse järgi kõrgema vormini ning teise tähenduse järgi seadustandva rollini. (88)

Dogmatism postuleeris subjekti ja objekti vahelise harmoonia ja tõi sisse Jumala (kellel on lõpmatut võimed) selle harmoonia tagamiseks. Kaks esimest „Kriitikat“ toovad selle asemel idee, et ese on paratamatult allutatut „lõplikule“ subjektile: meie oleme seadusandjad just nimelt oma lõplikkuses (isegi moraaliseadus on lõpliku mõistuse asi). Selles seisnebki koperniklik revolutsioon. Kuid sellest vaatepunktist näib „Otsustusjõu kriitika“ tekitavat erilise raskuse: kui Kant avastab võimete määratud vahekorra alt vaba kooskõla, kas ei too ta siis mitte lihtsalt tagasi harmoonia ja eesmärgipärasuse idee? Ja seda kahel moel: võimetevahelise nii-öelda „eesmärgipärase“ kooskõlana (subjektiivne eesmärgipärasus) ning looduse ja võimete eneste vahelise nii-öelda „sattumusliku“ kooskõlana (objektiivne eesmärgipärasus). (88)

Kuid: […] eesmärgipärasusel pole enam teoloogilist printsiipi, vaid hoopis teoloogial on inimlik „eesmärgipärane“ vundament. See muudabki tähtsaks „Otsustusjõu kriitika“ järgmised kaks teesi: võimete eesmärgipärane kooskõla on erilise geneesi objekt; Looduse ja inimese eesmärgipärane suhe on ehtinimliku praktilise tegevuse tulemus. (88-89)

Ühest külhest on väline eesmärgipärasus iseenesest puhtalt suhteline ja hüpoteetiline. Et see enam nii ei oleks, peaksime olema võimelised määrama viimset eesmärki; seda on aga looduse vaatlemise põhjal võimatu määrata. Me saame vaadelda ainult vahendeid, mis on oma põhjuse suhtes juba eesmärgid, mis on omakorda vahendid millegi muu suhtes. Me oleme seega sunnitud allutama välise eesmärgipärasuse sisemisele, s.t. pidama asja vahendiks ainult juhul, kui eesmärk, mida ta teenib, on ise organiseeritud olend.

Kuid teisest küljest tekib kahtlus, kas mitte sisemine eesmärgipärasus ei viita omakorda mingile välisele eesmärgipärasusele, tõstatades viimse eesmärgi küsimuse (mis näib lahendamatuna). (90)

„Viimeks eesmärgiks“ võiks nimetada ainult olendit, kelle olemasolu eesmärk on temas eneses; viimse eesmärgi idee kätkeb seega lõppeesmärgi ideed, mi ületab kõik meie vaatlusvõimalused meelelises looduses nagu ka kõik meie refleksiooniressursid.

Looduseesmärk on võimalikkuse vundament [fondement]; viimne eesmärk on olemasolemise alus [raison]; lõppesmärk on olend, kes omab olemasolemise alust iseendas. (91)

Ühesõnaga õigustab looduse teleoloogia küll aruka loova põhjuse mõistet, kuid ainult olemasolevate asjade võimalikkuse vaatepunktist. Küsimus lõppeesmärgi kohta loomisaktis (milleks üldse maailma ja ka inimese enese olemasolu?) ületab igasuguse loodusliku teleoloogia ja seda ei saa selle kaudu üldse käsitadagi. (92)

Siin ilmneb praktilise eesmärgipärasuse ja tingimusteta seadusandluse absoluutne ühtsus. See ühtsus moodustab „moraaliteleoloogia“, kuna praktiline eemärgipärasus on meis enestes koos oma seadusega aprioorselt ära määratud. (92-93)

Kuivõrd viimne eesmärk pole midagi muud kui lõppeesmärk, on ta põhjapaneva paradoksi objekt: meelelise looduse viimne eesmärk on eesmärk, mille teostamiseks ei saa piisata sellest loodusest enesest. Mitte loodus ei teosta vabadust, vaid vabadusemõiste teostub ehk viiakse täide looduses. Vabaduse ja Ülima hüve täideviimine meelelises maailmas kätkeb seega inimese algupärast sünteetilist tegevust: Ajalugu ongi see täideviimine, ning seda ei maksa segamini ajada lihtsalt looduse arenguga. (94)

Eesmärgipärase vahekorra sisseseadmine tähendab täiusliku tsiviilkonstitutsiooni kujundamist: see ongi Kultuuri kõige kõrge siht, ajaloo eesmärk ja puhtmaine Ülim hüve. (95)